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Abstract  
Empirical studies consistently report that labour productivity and TFP rise with city size. The 
reason is that cities attract the most productive agents, select the best of them, and make the 
selected ones even more productive via various agglomeration economies. This paper 
provides a microeconomically founded model of vertical city differentiation in which the 
latter two mechanisms (`agglomeration' and `selection') operate simultaneously. Our model is 
both rich and tractable enough to allow for a detailed investigation of when cities emerge, 
what determines their size, and how they interact through the channels of trade. We then 
uncover stylised facts and suggestive econometric evidence that are consistent with the most 
distinctive equilibrium features of our model. We show, in particular, that larger cities are 
both more productive and more unequal (`polarised'), that inter-city trade is associated with 
higher income inequalities, and that the proximity of large urban centres inhibits the 
development of nearby cities.  
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1 Introduction
For the first time in history, human beings who live in cities account for more than half of the
world population. Such concentration of population into a limited number of places is clearly
reflected by the spatial distribution of economic activity: cities, or places of high human density,
are locations of striking wealth creation that produce a disproportionate share of output and
spawn most innovations.1 Similar patterns are also observable at a more disaggregated level.
Many empirical studies have, indeed, substantiated that average productivity is increasing in
local market size and density: in any cross-section of cities, the elasticity of labour and firm
productivity with respect to size or density is positive and typically in the 3% – 8% range
(Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). Cities are also places par excellence where people acquire useful
skills and where new ideas are bread through interactions and knowledge transfers.
Despite their paramount contribution to wealth creation, slums in developing countries and
urban ghettos in rich ones remind us that cities are polarised: they are places where utter poverty
runs alongside phenomenal wealth. The reason is that although cities attract many skilled and
unskilled people and many firms, a substantial share of them fails to realise their aspirations.
This is exemplified by the substantial churning that occurs in urban areas, i.e., at any given
moment many firms are being created and many cease to exist.2
In a nutshell, cities are places that make workers and firms more productive (‘agglomeration’ ),
yet where failure is more likely than elsewhere (‘selection’ ), thereby generating large inequalities
(‘polarisation’ ). While each one of these three features has been addressed individually in the
literature there is, to the best of our knowledge, as yet no theory that addresses them simultane-
ously.3 The first contribution of our paper is, therefore, to provide a theoretical framework that
aims at filling this gap. To do so, we devise a model that blends heterogeneous managerial talent
1In 1990, the three Japanese main metropolitan areas (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya) made up for a third of the
Japanese population (about 2.6% of East Asia’s) but for 40% of Japanese GDP (about 29% of East Asia’s; see
Fujita and Thisse, 2002). Feldman and Audretsch (1999) report that in 1982, 96% of U.S. product innovation
took place in large metro areas, home to about 30% of the U.S. population.
2On the relationship between size or density and productivity, see Sveikauskas (1975), Ciccone and Hall (1996),
Syverson (2004), Combes et al. (in progress) and, for a survey, Rosenthal and Strange (2004). On the relationship
between city size and hours worked that result from both selection and agglomeration, see Rosenthal and Strange
(2008); on the division of labour and market size, see Baumgardner (1988). Glaeser et al. (1992), Henderson et
al. (1995) and Audretsch and Feldman (2004) provide evidence on innovation and growth in cities; on skills in
cities, see Glaeser and Mare´ (2001) and Bacalod et al. (2008). Harris and Todaro (1970), Cutler et al. (2005)
and Glaeser et al. (2008) address the issue of urban polarisation; on churning, see Duranton (2007).
3A recent and unique exception is provided by Combes et al. (in progress), who embed a reduced-form
agglomeration force in the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) framework. Their focus is mostly empirical and aims at
disentangling selection effects from agglomeration economies. A complementary approach is Okubo (in progress),
who encapsulates the Melitz (2003) trade model into a ‘new economic geography’ framework a` la Fujita et al.
(1999b). However, by nature of its focus, this model disregards urban structure.
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in the spirit of Lucas (1978), with functional forms taken from both the heterogeneous firm model
put forth by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and the ‘new economic geography’ (NEG) setting from
Ottaviano et al. (2002). The resulting framework allows us to parsimoniously analyse the vari-
ous interactions between agglomeration, selection and polarisation in an urban environment with
heterogeneous agents. We tackle, in particular, the questions of when cities emerge, how they
grow, whether or not they are resilient to adverse shocks, and how they interact with one another
through the channels of trade. Our second contribution is to show how selection and polarisation
interact, and to establish that urban polarisation is a by-product of the survival of the fittest in
a tough, competitive environment. Cities make the best of firms’ workers because they fail the
least productive of them, and the more so the bigger they are. Consequently, larger cities have
higher productivity but are more unequal (see Long et al., 1977, for U.S. evidence). Our last
contribution is to uncover a set of stylised facts in the data that are consistent with the most
distinctive equilibrium features of our model. We show, both theoretically and empirically, how
cities interact with each other and influence their respective productivities and sizes. Such an
exercise is, in our opinion, worthwhile since there is to date a dearth of simple testable predictions
derived from the (general) equilibrium conditions of NEG models (Head and Mayer, 2004a).
Previewing our main theoretical results, we first characterise the conditions under which one
city would emerge independently of others. We show, rather intuitively, that cities are more
likely to emerge and to grow in size with the quality of the commuting technology (e.g., following
the invention of the streetcar in the second half of the nineteenth century), the entrepreneurs’
expected productivity (linked, e.g., to the quality of the institutional, legal, and eductional
systems), and the magnitude of the agricultural surplus (as captured by stronger preferences for
manufactures). Strikingly, income inequalities are also positively associated with these factors.4
We further show that several equilibria may co-exist, including one without cities: whenever this
occurs, the equilibrium with the largest city also has, on average, more productive entrepreneurs.
In other words, large urban centres provide a tougher environment in which only the fittest
survive, and there is thus a positive equilibrium relationship between agglomeration and selection.
As a corollary, our model predicts that a relatively large proportion of urban dwellers fails to
be successful in bigger cities, thus making the latter more unequal and polarised.5 Using U.S.
4The mechanism we unveil in our model complements the one in Abdel-Rahman and Wang (1997), who also
develop an urban model that generates income inequalities. In their model, skilled workers are horizontally
differentiated only, and firms require different skills along a Salop circle; there is a finite number of firms because
of production non-convexities. Workers whose skills match the needs of the firm that employs them best will earn a
higher equilibrium wage (wages are set using a Nash-bargaining concept). Agglomeration economies arise because
the average mis-match decreases as the density of firms along the circle rises. To the best of our knowledge, theirs
is the only model that studies income inequalities in an urban setting.
5It is well known that the industrial mix of large cities is generally more diverse than that of smaller ones
(Henderson, 1997). Duranton and Puga (2005) show that the same holds increasingly true for the ‘functional
mix’ of cities. In both cases, these facts regard the horizontal diversification of cities. Here, we show that the
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Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) data, we provide some suggestive econometric evidence that
strongly supports this effect.
We then extend our model to a system of cities that are linked by a transportation network.
Specifically, for simplicity we first consider a symmetric equilibrium in which all cities are identical
(same size and same composition of successful entrepreneurs). In that case, the comparative
static results derived in the one-city setup carry over to this new environment. Having multiple
cities allows us, however, to analyse how they interact through trading links. We show that
lower inter-city trade costs are conducive to city formation and city growth: access to larger
markets, brought about by innovations in the transportation sector (e.g., the steam engine,
trucks, cargo ships, and containerisation) unambiguously increase the prospect of urbanisation
and city sizes. Historically, this corresponds to the emergence and domination of trading cities
like London, Genoa, Buenos Aires or, more recently, Hong Kong and Yokohama. We then study
the properties of urban systems made of cities of different sizes. The positive relationship between
city size and productivity readily extends to this context: larger cities provide a larger variety
of goods and services to consumers, thus establishing a hierarchy that shares some features
with Lo¨sch’s (1940). However, we also show that trading links may inhibit the growth of some
cities through ‘cannibalisation effects’. More precisely, the rise of a large, productive city might
hinder the development of nearby urban centres. The reason is that, from the persepective
of a given city, other cities provide both an outlet for goods and services they produce, yet
they also increase competition through exports by their entrepreneurs; the net effect is negative
when proximate cities are large enough to cast an ‘agglomeration shadow’. Building upon the
equilibrium conditions of our model, we derive a spatial econometric specification and provide
some evidence consistent with this cannibalisation effect (see Dobkins and Ioannides, 2000).
The presence of this effect has an important implication for the size-and-productivity literature:
running a simple OLS to estimate the coefficient of city size on city productivity produces a
downward bias when the spatial structure of the city system is disregarded.
Finally, we show that our framework can readily be extended to address a variety of issues.
For instance, our model suggests that cities evolve from ‘producer cities’ in the early stages of
the industrial-cum-transportation revolution into ‘consumer cities’ as they become part of an
integrated network of trading cities (Weber, 1958; Glaeser et al. 2001; Tabuchi and Yoshida,
2000). We also show that income inequalities are increasing in trade openness (at least at
the symmetric equilibrium), but for reasons that are quite different from those unveiled in the
international trade model of Helpman et al. (2008). Interestingly, the data reveals that income
inequalities are decreasing in market potential, and we explain how to reconcile this apparent
contradiction between our theoretical predictions and the empirical findings.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model
composition of large cities is vertically differentiated as well.
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and derives the equilibrium conditions. Section 3 then deals with the single-city case, whereas
Section 4 extends the model to multiple cities and trading networks. Section 5 deals with various
asymmetric configurations, while Section 6 concludes. We relegate the most technical proofs, the
guide to various calculations, as well as some extra material, to an extensive set of appendices.
2 The model
We start by sketching the model. There are Λ regions, labeled l = 1, 2, . . . ,Λ. Variables associated
with each region will be subscripted accordingly. Region l has a large and fixed population Ll
of ex ante undifferentiated workers. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor that she
can use either for producing a nume´raire good as an unskilled worker, or for becoming a skilled
entrepreneur. Becoming an entrepreneur involves a net entry or education cost and requires that
the worker moves to city l which provides the adequate environment for starting a business.
‘Learning in cities’ is in accord with empirical evidence (Glaeser and Mare´, 2001) and the fact
that most universities are located there. As will become clear later, becoming an entrepreneur
entails a risk of failure, in which case the agent is stuck in the city, does not produce, and
consumes solely from his initial endowment. Hence, there are three types of agents: successful
skilled agents in the cities (entrepreneurs); unsuccessful skilled agents in the cities; and unskilled
agents who decide to stay in the rural area. A maintained simplifying assumption is that workers
who choose to move to the city do not relocate once their decision to enter the urban market and
to set up business has been taken, irrespective of whether they succeed or fail as entrepreneurs.6
There are two sectors in the economy. The first one produces a continuum of varieties of a
horizontally differentiated good or service, whereas the second one produces a homogenous good.
Production of the homogenous good requires no entrepreneurial skills, occurs under constant
returns to scale, and takes place outside of the city (think, e.g., of agriculture). Furthermore, the
homogenous good is traded in a competitive market which is perfectly integrated. Hence, its price
is equalized across regions which makes this good a natural choice for the nume´raire. Perfect
competition ensures that marginal cost pricing prevails, which implies a unit wage everywhere as
long as the homogenous good is produced in all regions, which we henceforth assume to be the
case. The differentiated good is produced by the entrepreneurs using entrepreneurial skills and
6It is worth noting that workers have no ex ante information on their ex post productivity, i.e., there is no
sorting according to skills in our model. Yet, selection and agglomeration generate higher productivity in larger
cities regardless of sorting, so adding sorting to our model would reinforce our results. See Mion and Naticchioni
(forthcoming), Combes et al. (2008) and Combes et al. (in progress) for evidence on sorting. It is worth pointing
out that recent empirical evidence suggests that “large cities are more skilled than are small cities, but to a
modest degree. The differences are smaller than are the differences in worker education across cities, which Berry
and Glaeser (2005) argue are themselves not very large” (Bacolod et al., 2008, p.3). We disregard issues related
to sorting in this paper. See Mori and Turrini (2005) and Nocke (2006) for models of vertical city differentiation
with sorting.
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the nume´raire good. The latter is obtained either from the entrepreneur’s endowment or from
the country-side.
Previewing our subsequent results, only those entrepreneurs who are productive enough sur-
vive and produce, whereas low-ability entrepreneurs leave the market immediately without setting
up production at all. In other words, not everybody is equally successful. The minimum ability
that entrepreneurs have to achieve to survive is an equilibrium feature of the model that we refer
to as selection. Entry into the city occurs in reponse to economic opportunities, which depend
largely on the ability threshold required for producing successfully. We view the determination of
city size Hl ≤ Ll at equilibrium as the result of a tension between agglomeration and dispersion
forces, a phenomenon that we refer to as (net) agglomeration for short.
2.1 Timing
There are two stages. In the first one, workers decide whether to become entrepreneurs, in
which case they incur the entry cost fE ≥ 0 (paid in terms of the nume´raire and including the
opportunity cost of foregoing the unskilled wage), or to stay as uneducated workers in the country-
side. Henceforth, superscript ‘E’ is a mnemonic for ‘entry’ or ‘education’, whereas superscript ‘U ’
is a mnemonic for ‘unskilled’ or ‘uneducated’. Interpreting fE as a cost to acquiring education,
this means that agents decide first whether to acquire skills or not and, if so, become urban
dwellers, and only then learn their ability.7 Living in a city gives rise to extra costs and benefits,
which will be made precise below. Once the education-cum-location decision is taken, nature
attributes to each entrepreneur a horizontal characteristic ν and a vertical characteristic c: we
think about the former as the product variety (or a type of skill) and about the latter as her
entrepreneurial ability (or her skill level), which is linked to the subsequent productivity of the
firm. Specifically, entrepreneurs discover a variety or blueprint and nature draws the marginal
cost c at which they can produce this variety from some common and known distribution gl(·).
Upon observing their draw c, entrepreneurs chose whether to produce or not and to which
markets to sell. Entrepreneurial skills are an indivisible input and we assume that production
has to be spatially integrated, i.e., the entrepreneur must colocate with the production facility.
Entrepreneurs that entered market l in the first stage live and consume in city l. In the second
stage, entrepreneurs set profit maximising prices and all markets clear. We solve by backward
induction for subgame perfect equilibria.
7Note that fE might conceivably be decreasing in city size as a result of agglomeration economies, especially
if we think about it as being the costs of becoming educated. To keep the analysis manageable, we treat fE as a
parameter throughout the analysis and sometimes impose the knife-edge assumption fE = 0.
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2.2 Preferences, demand, and urban structure
Following Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), all agents have identical
quasi-linear preferences over the homogenous good and the varieties of the horizontally differen-
tiated good. Furthermore, each agent is endowed with d
0
units of the nume´raire. Varieties of
the differentiated good available in region l are indexed by ν ∈ Vl. In what follows, we denote
by Vhl the set of varieties produced in h and consumed in l, so that Vl ≡ ∪hVhl; by V
+
l ⊆ Vl the
subset of varieties effectively consumed at equilibrium in region l; and by Nl the measure of V
+
l
(the mass of varieties consumed in l). The subutility over the differentiated varieties is assumed
to be quadratic, so that utility for a resident in region l is given by:
U il = κ
i
{
α
∫
Vl
dl(ν)dν −
γ
2
∫
Vl
[dl(ν)]
2 dν −
η
2
[∫
Vl
dl(ν)dν
]2}
+ d0l , (1)
where α > 0, η > 0, and γ > 0 are preference parameters; where d0l and dl(ν) stand for the
consumption of the nume´raire and of variety ν, respectively; and where κi = 1 if i = E (the
agent lives in the city) or κi = 0 if i = U (the agent lives in the country-side). Our assumption
on κi implies that the differentiated good is sold and consumed exclusively in the cities, whereas
the homogenous good is available and consumed everywhere.8
Since marginal utility at zero consumption is bounded for each variety, urban dwellers will
in general not have positive demand for all of them. In what follows, we assume that all urban
agents have positive demand for the nume´raire, i.e., d0l > 0, which rules out income effects. A
sufficient condition for this to hold is that the initial nume´raire endowment d
0
is large enough,
which we henceforth assume to hold true.
All entrepreneurs reside in a monocentric city and, therefore, have to pay commuting costs
and land rents. Furthermore, there is at most one city per region.9 The aggregate land rent
is redistributed among the urban dwellers, each of whom has a claim to an equal share of it.
The urban costs in region l, when its size is Hl, are captured by the reduced-form θHl, which
8This assumption is a short-cut, the purpose of which is to make the market size for the differentiated good
endogenous while retaining a parsimonious model. A more elegant micro-foundation would be to assume that
shipping varieties from the city to the rural areas entails some cost. Our setting may be viewed as the case where
this cost is prohibitive. Though this is a strong assumption, it is worth keeping in mind that trade between major
cities (located often on the coast or along rivers) is often cheaper than trade with the hinterland, especially in
many developing countries equipped with a fairly poor network of secondary roads. Furthermore, a larger share
of urban output is made-up of non-tradable consumer services (restaurants, cinemas, theaters,. . .), which can only
be acquired when living in the city.
9The first assumption is made for analytical convenience. The key element is that urban costs rise with city
size, a property that is also encountered in non-monocentric city models like Fujita and Ogawa (1982), Lucas and
Rossi-Hansberg (2002) or Rossi-Hansberg et al. (forthcoming); for a survey, see Mori (forthcoming). The second
assumption is made without loss of generality since we can always redefine ‘regions’ so that there is, indeed, only
one city or none in each of them.
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includes both commuting and housing costs, and where θ > 0 is a parameter positively related to
commuting costs. Note that such an expression for urban costs generally prevails in monocentric
city models with fixed lot size, linear commuting costs and an equal redistribution of aggregate
land rent (Alonso, 1964; Fujita, 1989).10 In sum, becoming an urban dweller involves two types
of cost: the urban costs proper, namely θHl, and the entry/education cost, namely f
E. Let Πl
denote the entrepreneurial profit in l. The budget constraint is then given by
κi
[∫
Vl
pl(ν)dl(ν)dν + θHl + f
E
]
+ d0l = w
i
l + d
0
, (2)
where wil = wl = 1 if i = U , and w
i
l = Πl if i = E. In the latter case, her income (the
entrepreneur’s profit) also depends on her ability, as will be made clear below.
Maximising (1) subject to (2), the indirect utility of a type-i agent in l can be expressed as
V il = w
i
l + κ
iCSl + d
0
, where CSl denotes the consumer surplus (see Appendix A.2). Letting
phl(ν) stand for the price of variety ν produced in h and sold in l, the latter is given by:
CSl =
α2Nl
2(γ + ηNl)
−
α
γ + ηNl
∑
h
∫
V+
hl
phl(ν)dν
+
1
2γ
∑
h
∫
V+
hl
p2hl(ν)dν −
η
2γ(γ + ηNl)
[∑
h
∫
V+
hl
phl(ν)dν
]2
. (3)
As shown by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), preferences exhibit a taste for variety (∂CSl/∂Nl > 0)
and the consumer surplus is decreasing in the average price. The consumer surplus is also
increasing in price dispersion, as consumers can reallocate their expenditure towards cheaper
varieties (for a given average consumer price, CSl is increasing in the variance of prices).
2.3 Production
We assume that markets are segmented and that entrepreneurs are free to price-discriminate.11
The delivered cost in city h of a unit produced with marginal cost c in city l is τlhc, with τlh ≥ 1
(with strict inequality if h 6= l). Hence, (τlh − 1)c may be interpreted as the frictional trade cost
incurred in transporting a unit of any variety of the differentiated good across the two cities.
We interpret such a cost in a broad sense as stemming from all distance-related barriers to the
exchange of goods.
The variable production component requires using the nume´raire good as an intermediate
10Appendix A.1 provides micro-foundations for our reduced form of urban costs.
11Price discrimination is a prevalent feature across countries. In addition, using barcode microdata, Broda
and Weinstein (2008, pp.2-3) find that “the [law of one price] is also flagrantly violated across cities in the same
country. Thus, [. . .] prices vary substantially across space even within borders.”
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input so that the cost function of an entrepreneur with ability c in l is given by
Cl
(
{qlh}
Λ
h=1 , c
)
= c
(
Λ∑
h=1
τlhqlh
)
,
where qlh is output produced in l and sold in h. Recall that the nume´raire good is ubiquitous,
i.e., it is available everywhere at the same unit cost since it can be shipped freely. Variable costs
are, of course, strictly positive only if the entrepreneur choses to produce.
2.4 Parameterisation and symmetry
To obtain clear analytical results, we henceforth assume that productivity draws 1/c in region l
follow a Pareto distribution with lower productivity bound 1/cl,max and shape parameter k ≥ 1.
This implies a distribution of cost draws given by:12
Gl(c) =
(
c
cl,max
)k
, c ∈ [0, cl,max].
The shape parameter k is related to the dispersion of cost draws and is assumed to be the same
in all regions. When k = 1, the cost distribution is uniform on [0, cl,max]. As k increases, the
relative number of low productivity firms increases, and the productivity distribution is more
concentrated at these low productivity levels. Any truncation of the Pareto distribution from
above at c∗ < cl,max is also a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k. To avoid a taxonomy
of special cases, we impose α < cl,max for all l = 1, 2, . . . ,Λ in what follows. This assumption
implies that a stand-alone firm that gets a really bad draw will not be productive enough to
produce at equilibrium.
In what follows, unless otherwise specified, we further simplify the analysis by imposing some
symmetry assumptions across regions. In particular, we assume that the ability distributions of
entrepreneurs are identical (Gl(·) ≡ G(·) or cl,max = cmax for all l). We also assume that trade
costs are symmetric and that the costs for trading in the local market are negligible, i.e. τll = 1
for all l, which is a normalization:
τlh = τhl =
{
1, l = h
τ > 1, l 6= h
These assumptions may appear restrictive but we impose them for two reasons. First, they
greatly ease the analysis and the notational burden without significantly modifying our main
12This specific parametrisation for the distribution of productivity draws (entrepreneurs’ abilities) leads to a
size distribution of establishements which reasonably approximates the empirical one (Axtell, 2001; Bernard et
al., 2003; Del Gatto et al., 2006). Actually, the size distribution of firms is approximately lognormal. Using
Portuguese data, Cabral and Mata (2003) find that the size distribution of a cohort of firms is very skewed to the
right and converges over time to a lognormal distribution. The distribution of the population is also skewed to
the right, and the Pareto distribution is a unimodal right-skewed distribution.
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theoretical insights. As shown by Tabuchi et al. (2005) and by Tabuchi and Thisse (2008), the
general case of an urban hierarchy leads to a complex taxonomy and only allows for clear-cut
results in a few special cases (involving some symmetry). Second, making these assumptions
will emphasize that our model is rich enough to generate various urban configurations despite all
cities sharing the same fundamentals. However, when taking some key predictions of the model
to data, we will rely on a more general specification with asymmetric trade cost.13
2.5 Market outcome
Each entrepreneur maximizes operating profits in all markets with prices being her strategies
(since firms are atomistic, price and quantity competition are equivalent). Let phl(c) and qhl(c)
denote the price and the quantity sold by an entrepreneur with marginal cost c, when she produces
in region h and serves region l. Since markets are segmented and unit input requirements
are constant, entrepreneurs independently maximize the operating profits earned from sales to
different regions. Let pihl(c) = [phl(c)− τhlc] qhl(c) denote these operating profits, expressed as a
function of the firm’s marginal cost c.
Each firm sets profit-maximising prices, taking the other firms’ equilibrium strategies as
given. An equilibrium may thus be described by: a pricing strategy phl(c), i.e., a mapping
{phl(·)}
Λ
l=1 : R+ → R
Λ
+; an equilibrium mass Nl of entrepreneurs selling to region l; and finally Λ
‘enter-or-exit’ decisions {Ihl(·)}
Λ
l=1 : R+ → {0, 1}
Λ for each entrant which depends on the marginal
cost c. We show in Appendix A.3 that only the most efficient firms make non-negative profits,
whereas the least productive ones chose to exit (Lucas, 1978). More precisely, only entrepreneurs
with c ‘sufficiently smaller’ than some cost cutoff cl are productive enough to sell in city l. The
resulting Nash equilibrium prices can then be expressed as follows:
phl(c) =
cl + τc
2
, where cl ≡
2αγ + ηNlcl
2γ + ηNl
and cl =
k
1 + k
cl (4)
denote the domestic cost cutoff in region l and the average marginal cost of surviving en-
trepreneurs, respectively. Note the incomplete pass-through of own marginal cost and trans-
portation cost to consumers. Also, the consumer price is decreasing in the degree of competition
in the destination market, which is inversely related to cl (see (6) below). For each pair of cities l
and h, there exists an export cost cutoff clh such that only entrepreneurs with c lower than clh ex-
port from l to h. This cutoff must satisfy the zero-profit cutoff condition chl = sup {c | pihl(c) > 0}.
This condition can be expressed as either phl(chl) = τchl or qhl(chl) = 0, which from (4) yields:
chl =
cl
τ
. (5)
Equation (5) implies that chl ≤ cl since τ ≥ 1. Put differently, trade barriers make it harder for
exporters to break even relative to their local competitors because of higher market access costs.
13The analytical expressions of the equilibrium conditions in the asymmetric case are given in Appendix A.5.
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The mass of entrepreneurs selling in region l is given as follows:
Nl ≡
∑
h
HhG(chl) =
2γ(1 + k)(α− cl)
ηcl
. (6)
Note that (6) establishes a positive equilibrium relationship between the number of competitors
selling in city l and the toughness of selection: only the entrepreneurs with a productivity 1/c
larger than 1/cl survive. The larger the number of competitors, the smaller the fraction G(cl)Hl
of entrepreneurs that are fit enough to survive. Accordingly, we refer to 1−G(cl) as the ‘failure
rate’ in the urban market. Substituting (4) and (6) into (3), the consumer surplus can finally be
expressed very compactly as follows:
CSl ≡ CS(cl) =
α− cl
2η
(
α−
1 + k
2 + k
cl
)
. (7)
Thus, cl is a sufficient statistic to analyse the impact of any policy or parameter change on
consumer welfare. Specifically, as shown by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), consumer well-being
is increasing in the toughness of competition, i.e., ∂CSl/∂cl < 0.
2.6 Equilibrium
It is readily verified that
Πl(c) ≡
∑
h
pilh(c) =
∑
h
[plh(c)− τc] qlh(c)
= Ill(c)
Hl
4γ
(cl − c)
2 +
∑
h 6=l
Ilh(c)
Hh
4γ
(ch − τc)
2, (8)
where Ilh(c) = 1 if c < clh and Ilh(c) = 0 otherwise. In words, Ilh(c) ∈ {0, 1} indicates the
mapping that selects firms with productivity 1/c as a function of their region (l) and of the
destination market (h). Clearly, we have [0, clh] = {c
∣∣ Ilh(c) = 1}. The ‘utility-gap’ for a worker
with entrepreneurial ability c between remaining unskilled in the country-side or becoming an
entrepreneur in region l is given by:14
∆Vl(c) = Πl(c) + CSl − f
E − θHl. (9)
Using (7) and (8), expression (9) can be rewritten as follows:
∆Vl(c) = Ill(c)
Hl
4γ
(cl − c)
2 +
∑
h 6=l
Ilh(c)
Hh
4γ
(ch − τhlc)
2
+
α− cl
2η
[
α−
1 + k
2 + k
cl
]
− fE − θHl. (10)
14Recall that fE includes the opportunity cost of becoming an entrepreneur, i.e., the wage wl = 1 in the
homogenous sector.
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A worker decides to become an urban entrepreneur if her expected indirect utility is larger than
the (certain) equivalent that she could secure in the nume´raire sector. Formally, this is so when
E(∆Vl) ≥ 0. Hence, E(∆Vl) ≤ 0 must hold at equilibrium, which we henceforth refer to as the
free-entry condition.
We define a short-run equilibrium as a situation in which, contingent on entry decisions
summarised by the Λ-dimensional vector {Hl}
Λ
l=1, (i) entrepreneurs decide to produce or not and
how much so as to maximise profits, and (ii) consumers maximise utility. Thus, at any short-run
equilibrium, the masses of sellers must obey (6), which we can rewrite as:
α− cl
c1+kl Aη
≡ Hl + τ
−k
∑
h 6=l
Hh (11)
where A ≡ 1/[2ckmaxγ(1 + k)] is a recurrent bundle of parameters. Note that A captures the
underlying productivity of the economy as it is decreasing in the upper bound cmax of the support
of G(·). Prices adjust quickly but entry decisions are more lumpy. We thus define a long-run
equilibrium (an equilibrium for short) as a 2Λ-tuple ({Hl, cl}
Λ
l=1) such that the free-entry and the
short-run equilibrium conditions hold simultaneously. In other words, (i) entrepreneurs maximise
profits, (ii) consumers maximise utility, and (iii) agents decide whether to become an urban
entrepreneur or to stay put as a rural worker. Expected profits, net of urban and entry costs, are
non-positive at equilibrium. As shown in Appendix A.4, the expected value of (10) is given by:
E(∆Vl) = A
Hlc
2+k
l + τ
−k
∑
h 6=lHhc
2+k
h
2 + k
+
α− cl
2η
[
α−
1 + k
2 + k
cl
]
− fE − θHl. (12)
Expectations are rational and, at equilibrium, perfect. Agents are atomistic, hence they rationally
disregard the impact of their actions on equilibrium market aggregates; they also take all other
agents’ decisions as given. Conditions (11) and the free-entry conditions E(∆Vl) ≤ 0, where
E(∆Vl) is from (12), constitute a system of 2Λ equations in the 2Λ unknowns {Hl}
Λ
l=1 (city sizes)
and {cll}
Λ
l=1 (cost cutoffs).
3 Equilibrium with one region: ‘Urbanisation’
To set the stage, we start by analysing the equilibrium in the model with a single region. This way,
we are able to identify the three-way relationship among urbanisation, selection, and polarisation
in a parsimonious way. As we shall see, two types of equilibria may arise in this simple case: an
equilibrium in which no city forms and an equilibrium in which a city forms. To ease notation,
we drop the h and l subscripts for the time being, except for the cutoff (which may otherwise be
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mixed up with the firms’ individual c). Using (12), the free entry condition reduces to
A
2 + k
Hck+2l +
α− cl
2η
[
α−
1 + k
2 + k
cl
]
− fE − θH ≤ 0, (13)
with equality if H > 0 and strict inequality if H = 0. Condition (11), which determines the mass
of sellers, can be solved for H as follows:
H =
1
Aη
α− cl
c1+kl
. (14)
Two aspects of (14) are noteworthy. First, at any equilibrium with a strictly positive mass of
entrepreneurs (H∗ > 0), the equilibrium cutoff is strictly smaller than α. Second, ∂H/∂cl < 0
and ∂2H/∂c2l > 0, which shows that at any equilibrium larger agglomerations have lower cost
cutoffs than smaller agglomerations, i.e., there is a positive (and convex) equilibrium relationship
between agglomeration and selection. In plain English, a large urban place provides a tougher,
more competitive environment than a smaller one, and at rate increasing in city size; as a result,
only the fittest entrepreneurs survive and produce, and this effect is particularly strong in large
cities. Substituting (14) into (13), and rearranging, we obtain:
α− cl
2η
[
α−
k − 1
2 + k
cl −
2θ
Ac1+kl
]
− fE ≡ f(cl) ≤ 0. (15)
The nature and number of equilibria is thus fully characterised by the properties of f(·), which
we thus decribe next. An interior equilibrium with a city (H∗ > 0 and 0 < c∗l < α, which
we henceforth refer to as an urban equilibrium), is such that f(c∗l ) = 0; whereas an equilibrium
without city (H∗ = 0 and c∗l = α, which we henceforth refer to as a rural equilibrium), necessarily
implies that f(α) ≤ 0. A rural equilibrium is always stable whenever it exists, whereas an urban
equilibrium is locally stable if and only if ∂f(c∗l )/∂cl > 0. This latter condition implies that, at a
locally stable equilibrium, any small perturbation of city size is such that the free-entry condition
will bring the economy back to its initial situation.15
It is readily verified that limcl→0 f(cl) = −∞, which shows that there quite naturally always
exists an upper limit to city size. Furthermore, by continuity, whenever a rural equilibrium does
not exist there exists at least one stable equilibrium with 0 < c∗l < α (Ginsburgh et al., 1985).
A by-product of the last property is that the smallest root of f(·) (whenever one exists), which
corresponds to the largest equilibrium city size, is a stable equilibrium as in Henderson (1974).
Turning to the structure of equilibria, we can prove the following results.
Proposition 1 (existence and number of equilibria) The function f(·) has either one or
three positive roots, of which at most two are in [0, α). Consequently, there exist at most two
15This is, e.g., the case if, following the standard NEG tradition, we specify the following law of motion for Hl:
H˙l = E(∆Vl)Hl(Ll −Hl). Such an ad-hoc law of motion can be micro-founded (see Baldwin, 2001).
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stable equilibria: the urban equilibrium and the rural equilibrium. If no stable urban equilibrium
exists, then the rural equilibrium is unique. Furthermore, the equilibrium associated with the
smallest value of cl (the largest H) is always stable.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Insert Figures 1(a)–1(c) about here.
As shown by Proposition 1, only three equilibrium configurations may occur, which are depicted
by Figures 1(a)–1(c). The actual outcome depends on the parameter values of the model. Figure
1(a) illustrates the situation in which none of the roots of f(·) belongs to the relevant range
[0, α].16 In that case, f(α) < 0 and nobody enters the city. Turn next to Figure 1(b), which
illustrates the case in which f(·) admits a unique root in [0, α], denoted by c0L (‘L’ for ‘low’).
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In that case, f(α) > 0 so that some agents always have an incentive to enter the city. The rural
equilibrium does not exist for such parameter configurations. Finally, consider Figure 1(c). Here,
f(·) admits a second root in [0, α], denoted by c0M (‘M ’ for ‘middle’). The smallest root alone
corresponds to a stable (urban) equilibrium. In that case, f(α) < 0 and the rural equilibrium
co-exists with an urban equilibrium.18
Given the equilibrium structure, how do the equilibria change with the value of the underlying
parameters? Although f(·) is a transcendental function of cl and, therefore, does not allow for
algebraic expressions of its roots, we establish the following clear comparative static results.
Proposition 2 (monotonicity of urban equilibria) All stable equilibrium city sizes H∗ are
non-increasing in θ and non-decreasing in A and α. Put differently, lower commuting costs (lower
θ), a better productivity support (lower cmax and thus higher A), more product differentiation
(lower γ and thus higher A), and stronger preference for the differentiated good (larger α) all
weakly increase city size at any stable equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Proposition 2 establishes that any improvement in the benefits of living in cities, either as con-
sumers or entrepreneurs, makes the emergence of cities more likely and maps into larger equilib-
rium city sizes. By the same token, any reduction in urban costs that stems from an improvement
in urban transportation, say, is conducive to urban growth (Duranton and Turner, 2008). These
results are consistent with the historical fact that the Industrial Revolution triggered a mas-
sive urbanisation process which led to the current, unprecendented urbanisation rates: the U.S.,
which is currently the most urbanised large economy, had an urbanisation rate of only 6% in
16Three sub-cases may arise, depending on the shape of f , but in all of them f(cl) < 0, ∀cl ∈ [0, α].
17Three sub-cases may arise, depending on the shape of f , but in all of them f(c0L) = 0.
18A third root exists in this case, c0H (‘H ’ for ‘high’), but it can be shown that α ≤ c
0
H . See Appendix B.1.
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1800, whereas nowadays more than 80% of its population lives in cities. Our results also sup-
port the view that supply and demand factors are crucial in giving rise to and sustaining large
metropolitan areas. Specifically, at least three conditions must be satisfied for cities to emerge
and develop (see, e.g., Bairoch, 1988; O’Sullivan, 2007). First, there must be an agricultural
surplus so that the rural population may feed the urban dwellers (in our model, this condition is
trivially satisfied by the initial endowment in the nume´raire d
0
). Conversely, there must be some
demand for urban goods and services; in the model, the extent of this demand is captured by
the parameter α. Also, urban production is more valuable if product differentiation γ is large.
Second, the urban population must supply goods and services to sustain itself.19 It is able to
produce more, the more productive it is, i.e., the lower is cmax. Last, the transport system must
be efficient enough so that commuting is feasible even as city sizes increase. To sum up, a large
α or γ and a low θ or cmax are all conducive to the emergence of large cities.
When does which type of equilibrium arise? Closer examination of condition (15) allows us
to establish the following results.
Proposition 3 (rural equilibria) The rural equilibrium (H∗ = 0 and c∗l = α) exists and is
stable for all fE > 0. When fE = 0, it still exists but is a stable equilibrium if and only if
θ ≥ θU ≡ Aα2+k/(2 + k).
Proof. Condition (14) implies that H = 0 if and only if cl = α. Plugging this result into
(15) shows that it always holds for any fE > 0. Local stability of the rural equilibrium then
immediately follows from the strict inequality. When fE = 0, local stability of the rural equi-
librium requires that ∂f(·)/∂cl > 0 when evaluated at {H
∗, c∗l } = {0, α}. Some straightforward
computations and rearrangements, using (15), show that this is equivalent to θ > θU , where θU
is given by
θU ≡ A
α2+k
2 + k
. (16)
This establishes our result.
Proposition 3 reveals that the rural equilibrium is stable for all strictly positive values of fE .
The intuition is that since there is no urban market when nobody has established a city yet, no
one can profitably enter individually (as she has to pay some strictly positive net entry cost fE).
In addition, as also shown by Proposition 3, even when there are no net entry costs for becoming
an entrepreneur, the rural equilibrium exists and may be stable provided that either urban costs
(θ) are large, or the underlying productivity (A) is low, or preferences for the differentiated good
(α) are weak, or product differentiation (1/γ) is low. Conversely, when θ is low enough (θ < θU),
urbanisation necessarily occurs (hence the superscript ‘U ’). Hence θU denotes an urbanisation
19In an extension of the model in which cities trade with the countryside, urban dwellers exchange urban
products and services to purchase the agricultural surplus; the fraction of their output they so give away is
smaller the larger is their productivity.
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threshold. When the net entry cost into entrepreneurship is zero (fE = 0), expression (15) is (by
virtue of α > cl) equivalent to:
2θ
A
≥ c1+kl
(
α−
k − 1
2 + k
cl
)
, (17)
the right-hand side of which is strictly concave in cl, increasing when cl → 0, and its maximum
value is given by 3αk+2/(k + 2). The roots of equation (17) cannot be generally solved for.
However, the condition
θ > θR ≡
3Aαk+2
2(2 + k)
=
3
2
θU
is sufficient to ensure that there exists no pair {H, cl} with cl ∈ (0, α) and H = H(cl) from
(14) that is compatible with an equilibrium. In other words, when θ is large enough (θ > θR),
the economy remains necessarily rural (hence the superscript ‘R’). The following proposition
summarises these findings:
Proposition 4 (equilibrium structure when fE = 0) Assume that there are no net entry
costs for becoming an entrepreneur (fE = 0). Then: (i) H∗ = 0 is the only stable equilibrium for
all θ > θR; (ii) there exists a {H∗, c∗l } in R++ × (0, α) that is the unique stable equilibrium for
all θ < θU ; and (iii) for θU < θ < θR, both H∗ = 0 and some {H∗, c∗l } in R++ × (0, α) are stable
equilibria.
Proof. Parts (i) and (ii) are straightforward applications of the previous results. Part (iii)
is derived in Appendix B.3, which establishes that θ < θR is is also sufficient for an urban
equilibrium to co-exist with a rural one.
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium configurations in this case by plotting equilibrium city sizes
against the unit distance communiting cost. Stable equilibria appear in plain curves and unstable
equilibria are dashed.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
To summarise our foregoing findings, we think about θU as being the urbanisation threshold:
for all θ smaller than θU , urbanisation must occur. Conversely, the rural threshold θR is an
‘urban underdevelopment point’ since for all values of θ larger than θR no city can emerge. In
between, both an urban and a rural equilibrium can be sustained. Because the urbanisation
threshold lies below the rural threshold, there is path dependency in the economy. Starting
from high commuting costs, those costs must fall sufficiently for cities to emerge. However, such
costs can rise to higher levels later again without making the city disappear. This feature of our
model captures the resilience of big cities that nowadays feature high monetary and time costs
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of commuting and congestion.20 Condition (17) allows for a full comparative static analysis of
equilibrium in the simple case where fE = 0. For example, a larger θ, a larger cmax (and hence
a smaller A) or a larger γ all increase cl and, thus, decrease H (see Proposition 2). When the
commuting technology deteriorates (or when traffic congestion increases), or when entrepreneurs
draw from a worse ability support, or when products are less differentiated, aggregate productivity
falls and the equilibrium city size shrinks as entry becomes less profitable.
3.1 Entrepreneur city vs consumer city
Viewing the history of urbanisation following the Industrial Revolution as an ongoing reduction
in commuting costs θ, we observe that the early cities are rather small and not very productive
({H∗, c∗l } ≃ {0, α} when θ ≃ θ
U ). In such economies, prospective entrepreneurs migrate to
cities predominantly because they expect to reap positive profits. Urban migration is primarily
motivated by wages that are large relative to rural wages. Urban nominal wages can be relatively
high because the concentration of production and demand gives rise to increasing returns to scale
that outperform domestic or artisanal production. Put differently, the small initial cities are
mainly production cities. Furthermore, the ‘failure rate’ 1− G(cl) ≃ 1 − G(α) is relatively low,
i.e., the mass of unsuccessful entrepreneurs is small. However, the consumer surplus is rather
small too in this case: CS(cl) ≃ CS(α) = 0 by (7). In sum, urban costs are compensated for
by (expected) positive profits in the early modern history of urbanisation. Conversely, when θ is
sufficiently low so that urban markets become large and competitive, the failure rate 1 − G(cl)
is much larger. Expected profits are then no longer the primary driver of urban life as the
city’s local and specific service and product mixes work like local amenities to attract consumers
that display preference for diversity (Lo¨sch, 1940; Brueckner et al., 1999). At the limit, when
cl → 0, expected profits go to zero and the consumer surplus CS(0) reaches its maximum and
compensates for urban costs on its own. In other words, large modern cities are predominantly
consumer cities (Glaeser et al., 2001).21
It is also worth stressing that, after entry, unsuccesful entrepreneurs in the city have lower
nominal and real incomes than those in the country-side, yet their consumer surplus exceeds that
in the country-side. The reason is that they have access to urban diversity even if their choice
to move to the city turns out to be unsuccessful (recall that unsuccessful agents can still pay
20For example, according to the Daitoshi kotsu census (Major Cities Traffic Census) of the Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport in Japan, the average commuting times in 2000 for a one-way trip to work were of
about 67, 59 and 61 minutes for Tokyo MA, Osaka MA, and Nagoya MA, respectively. For the U.S., according
to Forbes: “the average commuter [in Houston] spends 20.9% of his annual household costs on getting to work.”
(http://www.forbes.com/2007/08/07/commute-housing-expensive-forbeslife-cx mw 0807realestate.html)
21The terminology ‘producer and consumer cities’ was introduced by Weber (1958), though his concept of
‘consumer city’ mirrors more closely the predatory behaviour of primate cities (Ades and Glaeser, 1995) than the
more modern concept of consumer city by Glaeser et al. (2001).
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for urban goods using their initial endowment). This aspect is taken into account in the entry
decision in our model. It is reminiscent of standard arguments for explaining the growth of cities
in the Third World, where the massive urbanisation in the face of urban poverty constitutes a
classical puzzle (see, e.g., Harris and Todaro, 1970).
3.2 Survival of the fittest and polarisation
From expression (14) we know that, at equilibrium, large cities are more productive. But are
they also more unequal? This question is warranted since not all entrants produce in equilibrium.
Only G(cl)H entrepreneurs remain in the market, whereas the remaining do not produce and
consume from their endowments. The failure rate 1 − G(cl) in the urban market influences the
distribution of income across successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs.
Our model allows us to take a new theoretical perspective on this question. To do so, we first
compute the average (operating) profit of all entrants as follows: Π = AHc2+kl /(2 + k). Making
use of the equilibrium relationship (14) between size and productivity, we then obtain: ∂Π/∂cl =
(α− 2cl)/[η(2 + k)], which is ∩-shaped. Average profits first increase in cl for 0 ≤ cl ≤ α/2 and
then decrease for α/2 ≤ cl ≤ α. Note that average profits include those of entrants who fail to
succeed in the city. It is hence informative to also compute the average profit conditional upon
survival, which is given by Π
∣∣
c≤cl
= Hc2l /[2γ(1 + k)(2 + k)]. Some standard calculations, using
again (14), yield
∂
∂cl
(
Π
∣∣
c≤cl
)
= −
(
cl
cmax
)−k
cl + (α− cl)(k − 1)
η(2 + k)
< 0,
where the inequality is due to 0 ≤ cl ≤ α and k ≥ 1. Hence, the average profit conditional upon
survival is increasing (and convex) in city size. The foregoing results show that entrepreneurs
who succeed reap higher average profits in larger cities, whereas the overall average (including
those who fail) decreases in city size beyond some threshold. Hence, larger cities are conducive
to the appearance of ‘superstars’ at the top of the urban income distribution (Rosen, 1981).
Turning to the variance of incomes (σ2 ≡
∫
Π2(c)dG(c) − Π
2
), some longer computations
show that it is given by
σ2 = c−kmax
[
Hl
2γ(1 + k)(2 + k)
]2
c4+kl
[
6(1 + k)(2 + k)
(3 + k)(4 + k)
−
(
cl
cmax
)k]
.
One can show that σ2 is first increasing and then decreasing in cl. Put differently, starting from
small and unproductive cities (cl ≈ α), the model says that income polarization (as measured
by the variance of incomes) first increases and then decreases with size as selection gets tougher.
To understand this result, we can decompose the variance between successful entrepreneurs, on
the one hand, and those who fail, on the other. All those who fail get the same outcome: the
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variance conditional upon failing is zero. The variance conditional upon survival is given by
σ2
∣∣
c≤cl
= c4l
[
ckmax
η(2 + k)
α− cl
c1+kl
]2
k(11 + 5k)
(1 + k)(2 + k)(3 + k)(4 + k)
.
It is readily verified that this is decreasing in cl (hence increasing in city size). In words, the
variance in profits of successful entrepreneurs is actually increasing in city size, i.e., there is
more inequality among the successful in larger cities. The foregoing results show why the overall
variance is not monotone: the ‘failure rate’ increases in larger cities, so that the variance goes
down as the group of those who fail are ‘uniformely poor’ (they all get zero operating profit, or
−fE in total). This trend is not offset by the increasing variance for the successful, as the latter
become a smaller share of the total. Eventually, the variance-reducing ‘between’ effect takes over
the variance-enhancing ‘within’ effect.
Although the variance is decomposable, it is not the best measure of inequality since it is
scale dependent. Let us then compute the Gini coefficient of the income distribution in city l
(see Appendix B.4 for details):
Ginil(k; cl) = 1−
2 + k
2 + 4k
(
cl
cmax
)k
. (18)
Note that this coefficient does not directly depend on city size H , because the Gini coefficient is
‘scale free’. However, size matters indirectly since we know that, in equilibrium, cl is a decreasing
function of city size. Straightforward inspection of (18) yields the following results:
Proposition 5 (polarization) Let income inequality be measured by the Gini coefficient. Then
income inequality is: (i) increasing at an increasing rate in the productivity cutoff 1/cl; (ii)
increasing at a decreasing rate in city size Hl; and (iii) increasing in cmax.
Proof. (i) It is readily verified that ∂(Ginil)/∂cl < 0 and ∂
2(Ginil)/∂c
2
l < 0. (ii) Invert
(18) to get an expression of cl as a function of Ginil, and substitute this for cl into (14). Then,
standard algebra reveals that ∂2Hl/∂(Ginil)
2 > 0 and thus ∂2(Ginil)/∂H
2
l < 0. (iii) This part of
the proposition is immediate by inspection of (18).
To check whether such relationships between size, productivity and inequality are borne out
in the data, and to revisit the issue of city size and income inequality, we use data from the
2006 American Community Survey, which provides data for 507 Core Based Statistical Areas
(henceforth, CBSA).22. Our three key variables are the total population size of the CBSA in
millions (size), the median household income of the CBSA in thousand US$ (medi), and the
household income Gini coefficient of the CBSA (gini). The partial correlations among these three
variables are consistent with the idea that larger metropolitan areas generate both more wealth
22The data includes 367 metropolitan and 140 micropolitan statistical areas.
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and more inequality. Indeed, these correlations are of .321 between median income and CBSA
size, .182 between CBSA size and the income Gini, and of −.277 between the median income
and the income Gini. Note that these partial correlations are in accord with the predictions of
our model but, of course, in no way indicative of any causality.
To get more detailed information on the relationship between size, productivity and inequal-
ity, we next regress the Gini coefficient on population size and squared population size, controlling
for median household income and various other factors.23 We control for median income because
we know from numerous previous studies that larger urban areas are associated with higher pro-
ductivity and wages. Thus, we want to isolate the direct effect of city population size from its
indirect effect via the (somewhat mechanical) reduction of the Gini coefficient by the median in-
come. We also include the square of population size to capture the non-monotonic effects present
in our model. We expect the Gini coefficient to rise with population size (large agglomerations
are more unequal), the coefficient on the square of population size to be negative (decreasing
marginal effect), and the Gini coefficient to fall with median income.
Insert Table 1 about here.
As can be seen from our basic specificationa (i) and (ii) in Table 1, even after controlling for the
fact that larger areas have higher median income (which reduces the Gini), larger areas are more
unequal. Put differently, larger urban areas generate more wealth and raise median incomes, yet
the polarisation effect is stronger and larger areas are associated with more inequality. However,
the increase occurs at a decreasing rate, which is in accord both with the decomposition of
the variance across groups derived from our model and from our theoretical results on the Gini
coefficient. Our baseline results suggest that successful households are better off in larger cities,
but that by far not every household succeeds. Our estimates tell us, for example, that increasing
the population from 12,950,129 in Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana MSA to 18,818,536 in New
York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island MSA raises the Gini by about .0622 from its baseline
value of .481, after controlling for differences in median household income (which is about 6.78%
higher in New York than in Los Angeles and which reduces the Gini by .0056). These figures
are quite substantial and suggest that the link between size and inequality is a prevalent and
quantitatively important phenomenon.
Specifications (iii)—(v) in Table 1 include various controls that have been found to be im-
portant in the empirical literature on city size and inequality.24 As can be seen from (iii), the
23A word of caution is in order. Like all the econometric exercises we conduct in this paper, our evidence
ought to be considered as purely indicative; we do not claim to have come up with a proper and sophisticated
identification strategy. Rather, we show that the partial correlations that exist in the data support the theoretical
predictions of our model.
24Previous empirical literature in the late 70s and early 80s has found mixed results as to the relationship
between city size and income inequality (e.g., Long et al., 1977; Nord, 1980). Most of those studies, however,
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share of Black and Afro-Americans in the CBSA has a positive impact on income inequality.
Further, as can be seen from (iv), more educated cities are more unequal. Last, as shown by (v),
including all the statistically significant controls does not invalidate the existence of a positive
and significant relationship between size and inequality. Though the coefficient on size is reduced,
it remains significantly positive, whereas size squared still enters negatively. Specification (vi)
replaces size with density. As can be seen, we also obtain a positive impact of density on the Gini
coefficient. A likely explaination is that density increases productivity and selection (Ciccone and
Hall, 1996; Syverson, 2004), thereby generating a more unequal distribution of income. Last,
specification (vii) uses the 1-year estimates of the 2007 American Community Survey to replicate
the basic estimations. We again obtain a significant relationship between inequality and size,
which appears to be almost the same than that in 2006.
To summarize our main findings, large urban areas generate more wealth and are at the same
time more unequal (polarised) than smaller cities. This theoretical prediction of our model shows
up highly robustly in the U.S. CBSA data.
4 Symmetric equilibria: ‘Trading cities’
In this section, we let Λ ≥ 2 to look for the existence of symmetric equilibria with multiple regions
and to characterise their properties. The analysis is similar to the case with Λ = 1, except for
the existence of trading links across regions. We thus exclusively focus on the impact of changes
in trade costs on the existence and the properties of symmetric equilibria. Propositions 1, 2 and
3 from the previous section are readily generalised to this new setting, therefore their formal
extensions are relegated to Appendix C to save space.
4.1 Trade and the rise of cities
Let Φ ≡ (Λ − 1)τ−k denote the ‘freeness’ of trade (Baldwin et al., 2003). This collection of
parameters takes value Φ = 0 when τ → ∞ (trade is prohibitive), or when Λ = 1 (there is a
single isolated region), and value Φ = Λ − 1 when τ → 1 (trade is costless). It is increasing in
Λ and decreasing in τ .25 Since the model is perfectly symmetric by assumption, an equilibrium
where all regions have the same size Hl and the same cutoff cl always exists. In the symmetric
case with trade, the free-entry condition (12) in each region reduces to:
(1 + Φ)A
2 + k
Hlc
2+k
l +
α− cl
2η
[
α−
1 + k
2 + k
cl
]
− fE − θHl ≤ 0. (19)
highlight that larger cities are more unequal than smaller ones in the U.S. Quite surprisingly, this literature seems
to have largely disappeared after the mid-1980s.
25Note also that a distribution which is more skewed towards lower ability draws (a higher value of k) implies
a lower Φ for any given τ , as fewer entrepreneurs are productive enough to export to other cities.
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Likewise, (11) becomes
Hl =
1
(1 + Φ)Aη
α− cl
c1+kl
. (20)
Substituting (20) into (19), and rearranging, we then obtain:
α− cl
2η
[
α−
k − 1
2 + k
cl −
2θ
(1 + Φ)Ac1+kl
]
− fE ≡ f(cl) ≤ 0. (21)
Rural and urban equilibria are defined as in the single-region case of Section 3. We can show the
following results.
Proposition 6 (cities and trade) A larger Φ (lower trade costs τ and/or more trading part-
ners Λ), a larger A or a lower θ all make the existence of cities more likely and weakly increase
their equilibrium size.
Proof. Proposition 11 in Appendix C generalises Proposition 1 to the Λ-city symmetric case.
It is a technical condition and requires no further discussion. Next, Propositions 12 and 13 in
Appendix C together establish that any improvement in the benefits of locating in cities, either
as consumers or entrepreneurs, result in larger city size and make the existence of cities more
likely, as did Propositions 2 and 3 in the previous section. More formally, a low value of Φ makes
the rural equilibrium more likely to occur. Indeed, as shown in Appendix C, if fE = 0 then there
exists a unique value (the urbanisation threshold), given by
θU ≡ (1 + Φ)A
α2+k
2 + k
such that the rural equilibrium exists and is stable for all θ ≥ θU , whereas the urban equilibrium
is the unique stable equilibrium when θ < θU .26 Likewise, there exists a unique θR ≡ 3
2
θU such
that the urban equilibrium exists and is stable for all θ < θR, whereas the rural equilibrium is
the unique stable equilibrium when θ ≥ θR. Clearly, θU and θR are increasing in Φ (i.e., with
freer trade), which proves our claim.
As established before in Propositions 3 and 4, the intra-city transportation system must be
efficient enough for cities to emerge in equilibrium. The new result in Proposition 6 is that
cities are also more likely to emerge if the inter-city transportation system is efficient enough
so that cities can trade with one another. Note that this result is not as obvious as it may
sound. Indeed, from the perspective of entrepreneurs in each city, lower inter-city trade costs
and a larger number of trading partners mean both a better market access (Krugman, 1980) and
tougher competition from entrepreneurs established in other cities (Ottaviano et al., 2002). The
latter effect can be seen from (20), where, given cl, ∂Hl/∂Φ < 0. As it turns out, Proposition 6
26In this section, we ‘reset’ notation in the sense that we redefine the urban cost thresholds of the previous
section. Obviously, when Φ = 0 the thresholds of the two sections are identical.
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shows that in equilibrium the agglomeration effect dominates, i.e., ∂H∗l /∂Φ > 0; the selection
effect is also stronger, the lower the trade costs τ are and/or the more numerous the trading
cities Λ are, i.e., ∂c∗l /∂Φ < 0.
Finally, as shown by Proposition 14 in Appendix C, Proposition 3 also straightforwardly
generalises to the case of trading cities.
4.2 Trade, profits and polarisation
Does trade contribute to rising profits and larger earning inequalities in cities? To answer this
question, we first compute the average (operating) profit of the entrants in the symmetric case
as follows:
Π =
(1 + Φ)A
k + 2
Hc2+kl =
cl(α− cl)
η(2 + k)
,
where we have used (20). Since ∂cl/∂τ > 0, it is readily verified that the average profit in city
l is ∩-shaped. Hence, as in the single-city case with respect to size, average profits are first
increasing as trade costs fall from high initial values, and then eventually decreasing as trade
becomes sufficiently free. In the early stages of integration, access to a larger market raises
entrepreneurs’ profits, whereas in later stages of integration increased competition reduces them
again as more agents fail due to tougher selection. The average profit conditional upon survival
is given by
Π
∣∣
c≤cl
=
(1 + Φ)
2γ(1 + k)(2 + k)
Hc2l =
1
2γ(1 + k)(2 + k)Aη
α− cl
c−1+kl
where we have again used (20). Since ∂cl/∂τ > 0, average profits conditional upon survival are
strictly increasing as trade becomes freer. In words, trade makes entrepreneurs and firms more
profitable as it increases average productivity. The rest of the comparative static results is as in
the single-city case and one can check that our results go through when we consider the freeness
of trade Φ instead of the trade cost τ .
Turning to the variance, the expression is too unwieldy to be revealing. However, the com-
putation of the Gini coefficient yields some clear results. It is now given by
Ginil(Λ, τ, k; cl) = 1− λ(Λ, τ, k)
(
cl
cmax
)k
, (22)
where λ(·) is a bundle of parameters, the properties of which are relegated to Appendix C.2. One
can verify that λ(1, τ, k) = (2+ k)/(2+ 4k), which reduces to the one-city case (18). Conversely,
when inter-city trade is perfectly free, the Gini coefficient (given cl) is also the same as in the
one-city case, i.e. λ(Λ, 1, k) = (2 + k)/(2 + 4k).
Insert Figures 3(a) and 3(b) about here.
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Figures 3(a) and 3(b) plot the equilibrium Gini index Ginil(Λ, τ, k) as a function of τ for
Λ = 4 and Λ = 10, respectively, by using the equilibrium value of (21) in (22). All the simulations
we have conducted show that inequalities rise as the number of trading partners increases, or
∂Ginil/∂Λ > 0 (see Appendix C.2). Turning to trade costs τ , we can algebraically show the
following result.
Proposition 7 (trade and polarisation) Let income inequality be measured by the Gini coef-
ficient at the symmetric equilibrium. Then income inequality is decreasing in trade/transportation
costs, namely ∂Ginil(Λ, τ, k)/∂τ < 0.
Proof. By inspection of (22), Ginil is decreasing in both cl and λ(·). Thus, to establish
the result in the Proposition, it is sufficient to show that ∂λ(Λ, τ, k)/∂τ < 0, which we do in
Appendix C.2.
Proposition 7 shows that trade integration and/or lower costs of shipping goods do not favor
more equality in earnings, at least in the symmetric case. The reason is that freer trade makes
selection tougher, which raises the incomes of the most productive agents but makes more agents
fail. As we show in appendix C.2, a lower τ also redistributes income from the least productive
entrepreneurs to the most successful ones, thus lowering λ(·) as a result. Consequently, the
income distribution gets more skewed towards the most productive agents, who secure a larger
share of total income. The recent trends of international integration are hence likely to spur
more income inequality at the city level.
The theoretical prediction of Proposition 7 does not open itself easily to cross-section scrutin-
ity, since it holds by construction at the symmetric equilibrium. Instead, assuming that the U.S.
system of cities could be reasonably approximated by the symmetric equilibrium of our model
(certainly as strong an assumption as it gets), we could use panel data to see whether urban in-
come inequalities are increasing as inter-city transportation and trade costs fall. Unfortunately,
such data are not available. We leave to future work the use of individual data to construct such
a panel of Gini coefficients and other measures of income inequalities. Nevertheless, we show in
Section 5 how market potential (which weights the inverse of bilateral distances by city size) is
relevant in explaining how ‘centrality’ and income inequality interact.
4.3 Stability of symmetric equilibrium
The exhaustive study of the stability properties of the equilibrium in the general case where
Λ > 2 is a daunting task because of the complexity of spatial interdependencies (Fujita et al.,
1999a, 1999b; Tabuchi et al., 2005; Tabuchi and Thisse, 2008). It is, therefore, beyond the scope
of the main text of this paper.27 Instead, we study a meaningful special case that allows us to
27In the technical Appendix TA.1, we provide additional stability results for the general case. Furthermore, in
the technical Appendix TA.2, we present a general numerical procedure that allows to computationally assess the
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parsimoniously illustrate the five key ingredients that shape the spatial outcome of our model:
selection, competition, agglomeration (‘backward’ and ‘forward’ linkages) and urban costs.
In what follows, we retain a simple definition of stability: we consider that the symmetric
equilibrium is (locally) stable if an arbitrarily small shock (to the endogenous variables) common
to all cities is self-correcting, i.e. df(·)/dcl > 0 at the symmetric equilibrium. To be even more
specific, we focus solely on the case without aggregate shocks, i.e.
∑
l dHl = 0, and where the
shock affects just two cities at the symmetric equilibrium.28 When is such a shock to city size self-
correcting? In other words, starting from a symmetric equilibrium configuration, imagine that
Hl increases by dH > 0 and Hh decreases by the same dH > 0, for some l, h ≤ Λ (and dHi = 0
for all i 6= l, h). Loosely speaking, this corresponds to an entrepreneur entering the ‘wrong’ city.
If E[∆Vl(dH)] = −E[∆Vh(dH)] is negative, then the shock is self-correcting and the symmetric
equilibrium is indeed locally stable ( the symmetry of the model implies E[∆Vi(dH)] = 0 for all
i 6= l, h). Otherwise, symmetry is ‘broken’ in the sense of Krugman (1991) and Puga (1999) and
the symmetric equilibrium is locally unstable (Baldwin, 2001).
To address this issue formally, let Hl = Hh = H , dH = dHl = −dHh > 0 and dch = −dcl.
Let also φ ≡ τ−k to alleviate notation. Differentiating (11) and (12) around the symmetric
equilibrium, and using (20), yields
dE(∆Vl) = −θdH
congestion
+
1− φ
1 + Φ
α− cl
η
cl
2 + k
dH
H
backward linkage
+
1− φ
1 + Φ
α− cl
η
dcl
selection and competition
−
1
η(2 + k)
[α
2
+ (α− cl)(1 + k)
]
dcl
forward linkage
(23)
and
0 ≡ (1 + Φ)
α + k(α− cl)
α− cl
dcl
cl
+ (1− φ)
dH
H
. (24)
A few aspects of (23) are noteworthy. First, the expected value of becoming an entrepreneur in l
is affected by both the mass of entrepreneurs, H , and their average equilibrium ability (which
is proportional to cl under the Pareto parametrisation). Second, there are a ‘pull’ and a ‘push’
factor in both. To see this, consider the first line of the right-hand side of (23). An additional
stability of any equilibrium candidate, including any corner solution.
28The absence of aggregate shocks is standard in economic geography models where the mass of firms and of
mobile agents is usually fixed (Krugman, 1991; Ottaviano et al., 2002). In the general case, local stability requires
that at any interior equilibrium, the Jacobian of f(·) with respect to c = (c1 c2 . . . cΛ) be positive definite. In
the numerical applications presented in Section 5, we check this condition systematically by verifying that all
eigenvalues of the Jacobian of f(·) are strictly positive (see the technical Appendix TA.2). However, to highlight
the key mechanisms that contribute to symmetry-breaking, we restrict ourselves to a less stringent necessary
condition in the remainder of this section. The rationale for doing so is that it is well known that characterising
the eigenvalues of a non-numerical system is a formidable task that leads to a complex taxonomy of different cases
(see Tabuchi and Zeng, 2004, and Tabuchi et al., 2005, for additional details on stability of spatial equilibria).
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entrepreneur in l means one more urban dweller, which increases urban costs by θ (congestion); it
also means one more consumer in l (and one fewer in h), which means a relatively larger market
in l and thus higher profits; this demand linkage is also known as a backward linkage (Fujita et al.,
1999b). The latter effect relies on market segmentation, hence it is increasing in τ (i.e., decreasing
in φ and Φ); at the limit, when goods markets are fully integrated (φ = 1), this effect vanishes
as local market size becomes irrelevant. Consider next the second line of the right-hand side of
(23). Less productive entrepreneurs (i.e., a larger value of cl) is good news for expected profits:
the failure rate is lower (less selection) and the pro-competitive effect is weaker (competition is
softer). This effect is also directly affected by market segmentation: as φ → 1, competition
becomes global and thus shifting entrepreneurs around has no impact on local expected profits.
By contrast, less productive domestic entrepreneurs is bad news for consumers because they pay
higher prices for their consumption bundle. The reason is that, since all varieties are substitutes,
less productive domestic entrepreneurs raise the prices of all varieties sold in l. Also, consumers
substitute towards non-local varieties as cl rises and pay trade costs on these imports. This cost
linkage, also known as forward linkage (Fujita et al., 1999b), is indirectly affected by the degree
of market segementation. Indeed, as can be seen from (24), the link between cl and H weakens
as φ decreases: swapping entrepreneurs between l and h has no effect on consumer surplus nor
on competition when the market is global.
5 Asymmetric equilibria: ‘Urban systems’
We define as an urban system a stable equilibrium configuration in which cities of different sizes
co-exist or in which some regions develop cities whereas others do not. As we shall see, the
analysis of such asymmetric equilibria is more involved because cities either inhibit or favor the
existence of other cities in complex ways (Fujita et al., 1999a, 1999b; Tabuchi et al., 2005). We
assume in the main text, as in the previous section, that regions are ex-ante symmetric, i.e., the
fundamentals of all regions are the same. This allows us to derive some clear results. However,
since our framework allows us to derive sharp general (equilibrium) conditions and to take them
to the data, we will work with less restrictive assumptions and relax symmetry when doing so.
This is another desirable and, to the best of our knowledge, original contribution of our model.
5.1 ‘Cannibalisation’ effects
We first analyse in more detail the so-called short-run equilibrium condition (11).29 The mo-
tivation builds on our postulate that this condition holds virtually at all times because prices
and quantities adjust swiftly. For any number of regions/cities, this condition reads (for all
29We impose the long-run equilibrium condition E(∆Vl) ≤ 0, where E(∆Vl) is from (12), from Subsection 5.3
onwards.
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l = 1, 2, ...,Λ):
1
Aη
α− cl
c1+kl
= Hl + φ
∑
h 6=l
Hh (25)
where the right hand side of the expression above is a measure of the so-called ‘market potential’
of city l (Head and Mayer, 2004b). Rewriting the system in matrix form yields

1 φ ... φ
φ 1 ... φ
... ...
φ ... φ 1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
F


H1
H2
...
HΛ


︸ ︷︷ ︸
h
= (Aη)−1


(α− c1)c
−(1+k)
1
(α− c2)c
−(1+k)
2
...
(α− cΛ)c
−(1+k)
Λ


︸ ︷︷ ︸
x
(26)
where F is a Λ-dimensional invertible square matrix whose determinant det(F) is positive by
inspection (all its off-diagonal elements are smaller than its diagonal elements) and h and x are
both Λ-dimensional vectors. We can use (26) to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 8 (size and selection in an urban system) Assume that regions are ex ante
(or fundamentally) symmetric, i.e., they face the same bilateral trade costs and have identical
ability supports. Then, at any equilibrium, selection is tougher in larger cities:
cl < ch ⇐⇒ Hl > Hh, l 6= h.
Furthermore, ∂Hl/∂cl < 0 and ∂Hl/∂ch > 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.1.
In words, Proposition 8 establishes two important results. First, selection is tougher in larger
agglomerations, i.e., the qualitative relationship established in (14) as a comparative statics
exercise carries over to an equilibrium relationship in an urban system. As a corollary of this
result, the positive relationship between the number of available varieties and the toughness of
selection in (6) implies a hierarchy of cities akin to the Central Place Theory of Lo¨sch (1940).
Second, own city size decreases with the own cutoff (selection) and increases with the foreign
cutoffs (competition). Insofar as a large Hl is the flip side of a low cl, this finding suggests
that urbanization in l may hinder urbanization in h and vice versa; we refer to this as the
‘cannibalisation’ effect of proximate city productivity (see Dobkins and Ioannides, 2000).
To check first whether the correspondence between city productivity 1/cl (where we measure
productivity by the median household income in the MSA) and city size is borne out in the data,
we first look at the (unconditional) Spearman rank correlation coefficient for our sample of U.S.
CBSAs. Computing this coefficient for the 507 observations yields .4616, which is statistically
positive at any conventional significance level.30 Hence, larger cities are more productive. Ob-
viously, the correlation is imperfect, as should be expected since the assumptions of equal trade
30The test uses the t-approximation for the Spearman rank correlation (see Zar, 1972).
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costs and equal productivity supports are unlikely to be satisfied in reality. Since the model
predicts that (Hl −Hh)(cl − ch) ≤ 0 for all city pairs h 6= l, we may compute as an alternative
test the percentage of correct predictions in the data. Out of the Λ(Λ− 1)/2 = 128, 271 possible
pairs, we have 84, 495 positive signs, i.e., about 66% of correct predictions. This statistically
exceeds the ‘coin-toss outcome’ at any conventional significance level.31 It suggests again that
there are systematic patterns in the data that are consistent with the short run equilibrium of the
(ex ante) symmetric model, but also that differences in bilateral trade costs and/or productivity
supports play a role in explaining the residual variation observed in the data.
Next, the theoretical ‘cannibalisation’ effect of proximate city size can be unveiled by explicitly
accounting for spatial interdependence in the whole system of cities. To this end, we explicitly
allow for different trade costs across pairs of cities. As shown in Appendix A.5, we may rewrite
the equilibrium condition (25) for the general asymmetric case for empirical purposes, as follows:
Hl =
1
Aη
α− cl
c1+kl
−
∑
h 6=l
φhlHh
where φhl ≡ τ
−k
hl . Let us linearise this expression around cl = α to get
Hl ≃
1
Aη
α− cl
αk
−
∑
h 6=l
φhlHh.
The foregoing expression defines a structural, theory-based autoregressive spatial system (hence-
forth SAR; see Lee, 2004) of the following form:
h = Xβ + ρWh+ ε, (27)
where W is the weight matrix (the weights are the trade frictions φhl); where X is a matrix of
non-lagged variables (the cutoffs cl plus a constant term); and where city size h is the endogenous
spatially lagged variable.
We estimate β and the spatial autoregressive coefficient ρ using both standard quasi-maximum
likelihood (QML) methods and Bayesian techniques.32 To do so, we firstly restrict ourselves to
31Define the random variable S =
∑
i
∑
j<isgn [max {0, (Hi −Hj)(ci − cj)}], which is binomially distributed
with Λ(Λ−1)/2 draws and probability 1/2. The null hypothesis for the coin-toss outcome is then given byH0 : S =
Λ(Λ−1)/4, whereas the alternative hypothesis is given by H1 : S > Λ(Λ−1)/4. The number of pairs Λ(Λ−1)/2 is
large enough so that we may use the normal approximation to the binomial distribution. Hence, S is significantly
greater than Λ(Λ − 1)/4 at the 1 percent (resp., 5 percent) level when z ≡ [S −M(M − 1)/4]/
√
M(M − 1)/8
exceeds 2.33 (resp., 1.65).
32Note that, in the notation of (26), (27) is the (stochastic) first-order Taylor expansion of Fh = Xβ, with
F = IΛ−ρW and X = [iΛ x], where IΛ is the Λ × Λ identity matrix and iΛ is the Λ-row identity vector. Note
also that the spatial autoregressive coefficient ρ need not lie in the range (−1, 1) sinceW is not row-standardized.
However, we use a numerical ajustement to make sure that the matrix F is invertible and the QML estimates are
accurate.
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the 367 Metropolitan Statistical Areas only and exclude the Micropolitan areas from our sample.
Indeed, there are issues of heteroscedasticty in the sample, and including the Micropolitan areas
exacerbates these problems in the estimations (sizes vary by a factor of almost 300 in the full
sample). Secondly, we provide estimates for the full sample including the Micropolitan areas as
a robustness check. In what follows, we use median income as a measure of productivity, itself
an inverse measure of the cutoffs. We hence expect a positive β-coefficient on this variable. We
also expect that ρ be negative, i.e., cities inhibit each others’ growth when they are close enough
(‘agglomeration shadow’). We measure the trade frictions τij by the great-circle distance between
CBSAs. Constructing φij then requires applying a negative power transformation, with exponent
k ≥ 1. As we have no a priori information on k, but since we work at an extremely aggregated
level, we expect that k is close to 1 (see Axtell, 2001, for the U.S. size distributions of firms).
Finally, we expect that ρ becomes mechanically more negative as k increases (since this reduces
the φij’s by exacerbating competition).
Insert Table 2 about here.
Table 2 presents estimation results for the SAR specification (27), using both QML (given
in columns (i)—(v)) and Bayesian techniques (given in columns (vi)—(ix)). Note, first, that
as expected, the coefficient on median income has a positive sign and is highly significant in
all specifications. More productive cities are bigger. Note also that the spatial autoregressive
coefficient is strictly negative in all specifications. However, it is only significant at the 10% level
using QML estimates for the 367 MSAs, and it becomes insignificant when using the full sample.
Thus, the ‘cannibalisation’ effect shows up in the data, at least when using the MSA subsample:
being close to large (and thus productive cities) has a negative impact on own size. A by-product
of this finding is that OLS estimates of the relationship between size and productivity are biased.
Indeed, running the simple OLS regression without spatial interdependence yields a coefficient
for median income of about .0553, which is smaller than the true coefficient because of ommited
variable bias due to cannibalisation. Finally, we control in specification (v) for the potential
influence of past dynamics on present city size. As can be seen, population growth in 2005-2006
has a negative impact on size in 2006, thereby suggesting that smaller cities have grown faster.
Yet, the main qualitative findings are again unaffected.
When controlling for outliers and heteroscedasticity, using Bayesian estimation, the main
qualitative findings of the model still hold true, though the magnitudes of the spatial autoregres-
sive coefficient and of median income fall. However, all estimates are much more precise, even
when using the full sample of 507 observations. This suggests that the relationship is significantly
influenced by the largest and smallest MSAs, and that the relationship for those ‘extreme’ obser-
vations may deviate from that in the rest of the sample (as in Zipf’s law of city size distributions;
see e.g. Ioannides and Overman, 2003 and Duranton, 2007).
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5.2 Market potential, accessibility, and polarisation
How do city-level income inequalities behave in a system of cities? In Section 4, we saw that the
expression for the Gini coefficient in the symmetric case was already too unwieldy to be worth
reporting in the main text. Matters obviously get even more obscure in a system of asymmetric
cities. However, the real world is deeply and fundamentally asymmetric.33 Therefore, we again
use U.S. CBSA data to establish the empirical nature of the relationship between urban income
inequalities and a city’s market potential or accessibility to other cities.
To begin with, we run simple ‘market potential regressions’ where own size and the distance
weighted size to the other cities is taken into account and estimate the short-run equilibrium
system. Formally, we define the market potential as mpj = popj +
∑
i6=j(popi/dij), which is
identical to the right-hand side of (25) with k = 1. Columns (i)–(iii) in Table 2 summarise our
results. As can be seen, market potential has a positive impact on income inequality. In words,
larger local market size augmented by distance-weighted foreign markets, increases inequality.
This result is robust across both MSA and CBSA samples and to the inclusion of our standard
controls. Note, however, that the coefficient on market potential is smaller than that on purely
local size (compare, e.g., (i) in Table 1 with (i) in Table 2). Put differently, distance-weighted
access to other cities serves to partly reduce income inequality.
We next construct the average distance of each city from all the other cities (a measure of
accessibility) and include it as an explanatory variable in the Gini coefficient regressions of the
foregoing section. Columns (iv)–(viii) in Table 3 summarize our results.
Insert Table 3 about here.
As can be seen from columns (iv) and (v), a larger average distance from all other cities
(worse accessibility) actually raises the Gini coefficient, yet leaves the impacts of all other vari-
ables unchanged. To understand what drives this result, specifications (vi) and (vii) reestimate
the model by excluding all CBSAs with an average distance of more than 3000 kilometers from
the rest of the cities.34 As one can see, excluding the very remote regions, for which inequality
might be driven by structurally very different mechanisms than mainland U.S., leads to insignif-
icant positive point estimates of average distance on the Gini coefficients. Accessibility seems,
therefore, to play an insignificant role in shaping urban inequality.35 It is worth stressing that
this result may stem from the fact that Proposition 7, which is a comparative statics prediction,
33The fundamental importance of asymmetry has been recognised by the 2008 Nobel Prize in Physics, attributed
to Makoto Kobayashi, Toshihide Maskawa and Yoichiro Nambu “for the discovery of the mechanism of spontaneous
broken symmetry in subatomic physics” (Nobel Foundation, 2008).
34Doing so excludes 13 observations that are all located in Puerto Rico, Alaska or Hawaii.
35Alternatively, we have replaced the arithmetic average distance with the geometric and the harmonic aver-
age distances. The qualitative results are unchanged: average distance (however measured) has a positive and
significant coefficient, which gets insignificant when excluding the 13 remote observations.
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has been derived under the strong assumption of perfect symmetry. It is hence not clear how it
needs to be modified to fit the asymmetries in the data in a cross-section of cities. Furthermore,
the big polarised U.S. cities are predominantly located close to the coasts, thereby raising their
average distance when compared to the smaller less polarised yet more accessible cities in the
mid-west.
5.3 Core-periphery equilibria
In the remainder of this section, we study some properties of asymmetric long-run equilibria
using conditions (11) and (12). Two natural questions arise in NEG models: are there equilibria
in which one region has a city but the others have none? When is such an extreme form of urban
primacy (know as a core-periphery configuration in the NEG) a stable equilibrium? To answer
these questions, consider a setting with an arbitrary number Λ ≥ 2 of regions and impose the
conditions Hl > 0, Hh = 0 for all h 6= l, and 0 < cl, ch ≤ α. First, by (25), Hh = 0 necessarily
implies that
α− cl
α− ch
(
ch
cl
)1+k
>
1
φ
. (28)
It is readily verified that Hl > 0 whenever the foregoing condition holds. Indeed, a sufficient
condition for Hl > 0 is
α− cl
α− ch
(
ch
cl
)1+k
> φ
which is satisfied whenever (28) holds since φ < 1. The foregoing argument only requires the
short-run equilibrium relationship (11). To be part of a long-run equilibrium, the free-entry
condition (12) must hold with equality for Hl > 0 (so that all entry opportunities have been
arbitraged away in city l) and it must hold with a strict inequality for Hh = 0 (so that nobody
has any incentive to ‘start a city’). Formally, E(∆Vl) = 0 and E(∆Vh) < 0.
Consider first the simple case in which there are no net entry costs for becoming an en-
trepreneur (fE = 0). Then we can show the following impossibility result:
Proposition 9 (no asymmetric equilibria in the simple case) Assume that there are no
net entry costs for becoming an entrepreneur (fE = 0). Then there exists no equilibrium such
that H∗l > 0 and H
∗
h = 0 for all h 6= l.
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
Proposition 9 shows that no core-periphery equilibria exist in the simple case. More generally,
it can be shown that there exist no other asymmetric equilibria with Hl > 0 and Hh > 0 (see
Appendix D.2 for further details).
Consider next the more general case where fE > 0. For simplicity, we first investigate the
possible existence of a core-periphery configuration with two regions h and l. Clearly, H∗l > 0,
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0 < c∗l , c
∗
h ≤ α and H
∗
h = 0 constitute an equilibrum if the following set of conditions hold
simultaneously for {H∗l , c
∗
l } and {H
∗
h, c
∗
h}:
0 =
A
k + 2
Hlc
2+k
l +
α− cl
2η
[
α−
1 + k
2 + k
cl
]
− θHl − f
E (29)
0 ≥
φA
k + 2
Hlc
2+k
l +
α− ch
2η
[
α−
1 + k
2 + k
ch
]
− fE, ∀h 6= l (30)
0 = −Hl +
1
Aη
α− cl
c1+kl
(31)
0 = −φHl +
1
Aη
α− ch
c1+kh
, ∀h 6= l. (32)
Furthermore, the condition for local stability associated with H∗l > 0 (which is given by either
∂(E(∆Vl))/∂Hl < 0 at H
∗
l or, equivalently, by ∂(E(∆Vl))/∂cl > 0 at c
∗
l ) need to hold. Despite the
absence of closed form solutions to the system (29)–(32), we can prove several results analytically.
First, H∗l and c
∗
l are uniquely determined by (29) and (31) and these are invariant in φ. Second,
the two short-run equilibrium conditions (31) and (32) imply that c∗l < c
∗
h by virtue of 0 < φ < 1.
Third, assume that fE and θ are low enough so that the conditions for existence and stability of
an urban equilibrium in the one-region case of Section 3 are fulfilled. Then, we can establish the
following results.
Proposition 10 (core-periphery equilibria) Assume that fE and θ are low enough so that
a stable urban equilibrium exists when φ = 0. Then there exists a unique threshold φsust in
(0, 1), called the ‘sustain point’, such that a core-periphery equilibrium in the two-region case,
with H∗l > 0 and H
∗
h = 0 for all h 6= l, exists if (and only if) φ < φ
sust (i.e. inter-city trade costs
are large enough).
Proof. See Appendix D.3.
Proposition 10 establishes that, in the limit when both markets are fully integrated (costless inter-
city trade), location is irrelevant for both profits and consumer surplus (Πl = Πh and CSl = CSh)
but remains relevant for the urban cost of living. This is because urban dwellers incur commuting
and housing costs and these depend on Hl and Hh. Thus, city sizes may not differ by much when
φ ≃ 1 (i.e., τ ≃ 1). More generally, this result shows that at the limit φ → 1 all cities must
be symmetric at equilibrium; if they are not, some agents can relocate and increase their well-
being, which is inconsistent with the definition of an equilibrium. In the opposite configuration
(prohibitive inter-city trade costs), cities are in isolation and the conditions for existence of a
core-periphery equilibrium boil down to the conditions for urbanisation of Section 3.
Note that this extreme form of urban primacy arises among ex-ante, or structurally, identical
regions. The result with symmetric trade costs established in Proposition 10 is in line with the
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findings of Ades and Glaeser (1995) and Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996), whereby urban
primacy and trade openness (both internal and international) are negatively associated.
Last, one may wonder whether core-periphery equilibria exist when there are more than two
regions. This issue is hard to tackle analytically, especially since stability of equilibria becomes
more difficult to establish. However, we can readily construct numerical examples exhibiting
stable extreme urban primacy, as shown in Appendix D.4.
5.4 Darwinian systems of cities
In this subsection we construct another asymmetric long-run equilibrium using analytical means.
Specifically, we illustrate the existence of an agglomeration shadow of large urban centres by
considering what we could call an extreme Darwinian system of cities. The existence of an
agglomeration shadow is due to the mechanism uncovered in Proposition 8 of Section 5.1, for
which we have found some empirical evidence in the foregoing.
Assume that Λ = 4 regions are evenly located around a circle (a ‘racetrack’ economy as
in Fujita et al., 1999b). Shipping goods takes place on the circumference of the circle only.
Therefore, τlh = τ
min{|l−h|,|4+l−h|}. Let us construct an equilibrium in which regions 1 and 3 only
develop cities of equal size H∗l > 0 that hinder the development the urbanisation of regions 2
and 4 (H∗2 = H
∗
4 = 0). The equilibrium conditions in this case are (l ∈ {1, 3}, h ∈ {2, 4}):
0 =
(1 + φ2)A
2 + k
Hlc
k+2
l +
α− cl
2η
[
α−
1 + k
2 + k
cl
]
− θHl − f
E (33)
0 ≥
2φA
2 + k
Hlc
k+2
l +
α− ch
2η
[
α−
1 + k
2 + k
ch
]
− fE, ∀h 6= l (34)
0 = −(1 + φ2)Hl +
1
Aη
α− cl
c1+kl
(35)
0 = −2φHl +
1
Aη
α− ch
c1+kh
, ∀h 6= l. (36)
Comparing the system of equations (33)–(36) with (29)–(32), it is easy to see that the qualitative
properties of the former are similar to those of the latter. Specifically, there exists a threshold
φDarwin in (0, 1), similar in nature to the sustain point above, such that the extreme Darwinian
system of cities (with every other region developing a city) exists if and only if φ < φDarwin (i.e.
inter-city trade costs are large enough).
However, there is still a key difference. First, the equilibrium cutoff c∗l is no longer invariant
in φ: as trade freeness rises, firms in either Darwinian city face increased competition from firms
in the other cities, and the least productive of them exit, hence ∂c∗l /∂φ < 0. The effect of an
increase of φ on the size H∗l of the Darwinian cities is ambiguous: one the one hand, competition
is tougher and failures rates are higher, which discourages entry, but on the other hand the
market for goods expands with access to the other Darwinian city, which encourages entry.
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To get some numerical idea of the Darwinian case, we can readily construct an example using
the following parameter values for Λ = 4 regions: α = 17.2, γ = 2, η = 22.5, H0 = 4, τ = 1.5,
k = 1.2, cmax = 30, f
E = 12, θ = 0.14. The resulting equilibrium is such that H∗1 = H
∗
3 = 0.8014,
c∗1 = c
∗
3 = 9.8661, and c
∗
2 = c
∗
4 = 10.1837. It is worth noting that, when compared to the
numerical core-periphery example given in Appendix D.4, the sum of the sizes of the two cities
is smaller than that in the case of extreme urban primacy. This is another manifestation of the
agglomeration shadow, which puts downward pressure on city sizes.
6 Conclusions
Cities are places of phenomenal wealth creation: in any cross-section of cities, the elasticity of
worker and firm productivity with respect to city size is positive and typically in the 3% − 8%
range. Empirically, this is so because the most efficient firms and the most skilled workers self-
select into large cities, which then make them even more productive via agglomeration economies.
Cities are also polarised: income inequalities are typically increasing in the size of urban agglom-
erations, at least in the U.S. This paper has provided a model of vertical differentiation of cities
to account for such facts simultaneously. It has then used our theoretical framework to shed light
on phenomena such as urbanisation, city resilience and the cannibalisation effect of agglomera-
tion shadows, whereby the proximity of a large metropolitan area inhibits the development of
smaller cities. A key finding of the paper is that large urban areas are more productive and more
polarised than smaller ones, and that the latter is a consequence of the selection effect that is in
part responsible for the former.
We have also unveiled a set of stylised facts from the data that are consistent with the most
distinctive equilibrium conditions of our model. As a result, we conjecture that our model may
be well-suited as a basis for further studies related to issues on urbanisation, agglomeration, and
polarisation. On the empirical front, as we have said, we view the evidence provided in the paper
as suggestive only. In future work, we need to think more deeply about better identification
strategies. We also plan to use micro data to understand whether large cities are more unequal
because they increase the dispersion of incomes and wages for a given level of observed skills or
types (the so-called ‘residual’ wage inquality), or whether they are more unequal as the result of
the observable ‘divergence of human capital levels across cities’ (a composition effect).36 Using
individual data, and incorporating sorting according to skills and types into our theoretical
framework, should also help us identify the effects that are predicted by our theory.
36See Berry and Glaeser (2005). On the ‘residual’ wage inequality, see e.g. Lemieux (2006) or Helpman et al.
(2008) and the references therein for a discussion.
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Appendix A: Guide to calculations
A.1. Micro-foundations for urban costs
Assume that all city dwellers consume one unit of land, as in Alonso (1964). Assume further
that the central business district (CBD) is located at x = 0, so that a city of size Hl stretches
out from −Hl/2 to Hl/2. Without loss of generality, we normalize the opportunity cost of land
at the urban fringe: Rl(Hl/2) = Rl(−Hl/2) = 0. Each city dweller commutes to the CBD at
constant unit-distance cost ξ > 0. Hence, an agent located at x incurrs a commuting cost of
ξ|x|. Because expected profits and consumer surplus do not depend on city location (see Section
2), the sum of commuting costs and land rent must be identical across locations at a residential
equilibrium. This implies that
Rl
(
Hl
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ξ
Hl
2
= Rl(x) + ξ|x|,
which yields the equilibrium land rent schedule Rl(x) = ξ [Hl/2− |x|]. The aggregate land rent
is thus given by
ALRl =
∫ Hl
2
−
Hl
2
Rl(x) =
θ
4
H2l .
When ALRl is equally redistributed to all agents, equilibrium total urban costs are
ALRl
Hl
− Rl(x)− ξ|x| = −
ξ
4
Hl.
Letting θ ≡ ξ/4 > 0 then yields our reduced form for urban costs.
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A.2. Derivation of consumer surplus
Denote by Dl ≡
∫
Vl
dl(ν)dν the demand for all varieties of the differentiated good. The inverse
demand of an agent of type i = E for each variety ν of that good is obtained by maximizing (1)
under (2) and can be expressed as follows:
pl(ν) = α− γdl(ν)− ηDl (A.1)
whenever dl(ν) ≥ 0. Denote by V
+
l ⊆ Vl the subset of varieties effectively consumed in region l.
Expression (A.1) can be inverted to yield a linear demand system as follows:
ql(ν) ≡ Hldl(ν) = Hl
[
α
ηNl + γ
−
pl(ν)
γ
+
ηNl
ηNl + γ
pl
γ
]
, ∀ν ∈ V+l , (A.2)
where pl ≡ (1/Nl)
∫
V+
l
pl(ν)dν stands for their average price. By definition, V
+
l is the largest
subset of Vl satisfying
pl(ν) ≤
1
ηNl + γ
(γα + ηNlpl) ≡ p
d
l . (A.3)
For any given level of product differentiation γ, lower average prices pl or a larger number of
competing varieties Nl increase the price elasticity of demand and decrease the price bound p
d
l
defined in (A.3). Stated differently, a lower pl or a larger Nl generate a ‘tougher’ competitive
environment, thereby reducing the maximum price at which entrepreneurs still face positive
demand.
A.3. Nash price equilibrium and profit functions
Let
pihl(c) = [phl(c)− τhlc] qhl(c)
denote operating profits, expressed as a function of the firm’s marginal cost c. The firms sets
prices in order to maximise these profits for each market separately. Then, the profit maximizing
prices and output levels must satisfy (for h 6= l, with τ substituted for by 1 otherwise):
phl(c) =
αγ + ηNlpl
2(γ + ηNl)
+
τc
2
and qhl(c) =
Hl
γ
[phl(c)− τc] . (A.4)
Integrating the prices in (A.4) over all available varieties, summing across regions and rearranging
yields the average delivered price in market l as follows:
pl =
αγ + ηNlpl
2(γ + ηNl)
+
cl
2
⇒ pl =
αγ + (γ + ηNl)cl
2γ + ηNl
, (A.5)
where
cl ≡
τ
Nl
∑
h
[∫
V+
lh
c dG(c)
]
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stands for the average delivered cost of surviving firms selling to l. Plugging (A.5) into (A.4), some
straightforward rearrangements show that the Nash equilibrium prices can then be expressed as
follows:
phl(c) =
cl + τc
2
, where cl ≡
2αγ + ηNlcl
2γ + ηNl
denotes the domestic cost cutoff in region l. Only entrepreneurs with c ‘sufficiently smaller’ than
cl are productive enough to sell in city l. This can be seen by expressing qhl in (A.4) more
compactly as follows:
qhl(c) = Hl
cl − τc
2γ
. (A.6)
Clearly, selling in a ‘foreign’ market l when producing in h requires that c ≤ cl/τ , whereas the
analoguous condition for selling in the ‘domestic’ market is given by c ≤ cl (recall that τll = 1).
In what follows, we denote by chl the ‘export’ cutoff for firms producing in region h and selling to
region l. This cutoff must satisfy the zero-profit cutoff condition chl = sup {c | pihl(c) > 0}. From
expressions (4) and (A.6), this condition can be expressed as either phl(chl) = τchl or qhl(chl) = 0,
which yields:
chl =
cl
τ
.
Equation (5) implies that chl ≤ cl since τ ≥ 1. Put differently, trade barriers make it harder for
exporters to break even relative to their local competitors because of higher market access costs.
Since pdl = pll(cl) = cl, the zero-profit cutoff condition (A.3) can be expressed as follows:
1
γ + ηNl
(γα + ηNlpl) = cl, with pl =
αγ + (γ + ηNl)cl
2γ + ηNl
.
We can thus solve for the mass of entrepreneurs selling in region l as follows:
Nl =
2γ
η
α− cl
cl − cl
. (A.7)
Using the Pareto parametrization of Section 2.3, the average price and the average cost in region
l are computed as follows:
pl =
1 + 2k
2 + 2k
cl and cl =
k
1 + k
cl,
i.e., they are given by a scaling of the domestic cutoff. Using this expression, as well as (A.7),
we can then express the mass of sellers in l as follows:
Nl ≡
∑
h
HhG(chl) =
2γ(k + 1)(α− cl)
ηcl
,
where the first equality comes from the definition of Nl.
The consumer surplus is finally derived by substituting the equilibrium prices into (3).
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A.4. Expected profits
The expected profit in region l in the symmetric case under the Pareto parametrization is given
as follows:
E(Πl) =
1
Hl
[
Hl
4γ
∫ cl
0
(cl − c)
2 HldGl(c) +
Hh
4γ
∫ ch
τ
0
(ch − τc)
2 HldGl(c)
]
=
(cmaxl )
−k[Hlc
2+k
l + τ
−kHhc
2+k
h ]
2γ(1 + k)(2 + k)
.
Using this expression, and noting that neither the consumer surplus nor the urban costs depend
on the entrepreneur’s ability, we readily obtain expression (12).
A.5. Asymmetric case
Note that expression (12) is derived under the simplifying assumption of symmetry, which we
impose in the main body of the text. However, for applied purposes we will assume that trade
costs may differ across regions. The general expressions of the equilibrium conditions are then
as follows. First, the zero-expected utility gap is given by
E(∆Vl) =
c−kl,max[Hlc
2+k
l +
∑
h 6=l τ
−k
lh Hhc
2+k
h ]
2γ(1 + k)(2 + k)
+
(α− cl)
2η
[
α−
1 + k
2 + k
cl
]
− fE − θHl. (A.8)
Second, the identity for the masses of sellers (6) can be rewritten as:
2γ(k + 1)(α− cl)
ηcl
≡ Hl
(
cl
cl,max
)k
+
∑
h 6=l
τ−khl Hh
(
cl
ch,max
)k
(A.9)
Conditions (A.8) and (A.9) constitute a system of 2Λ equations in the 2Λ unknowns {Hl}
Λ
l=1
(city sizes) and {cl}
Λ
l=1.
Appendix B: Proofs for Section 3
B.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Recall Proposition 1: The function f(·) has either one or three positive roots, of which at most
two are in [0, α). Consequently, there exist at most two stable equilibria: the urban equilibrium
and the rural equilibrium. If no stable urban equilibrium exists, then the rural equilibrium is
unique. Furthermore, the equilibrium associated with the smallest value of cl (the largest H) is
always stable.
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Proof. Rewriting f(·) in decreasing order of its powers in cl, we obtain:
f(cl) = K1c
2
l −K2cl ±K3 +K4c
−k
l −K5c
−k−1
l
where all coefficients Ki are strictly positive. Note that the constant K3 (which is associated
with c0l ) may a priori be positive or negative, hence the ± sign in front of it. As one can
see, in all cases there are at most three sign changes (from positive to negative or vice versa)
between the coefficients of the consecutive powers. Let the number of positive roots be n and
the number of sign changes be s. By Laguerre’s (1883) generalization of Descartes’ rule of signs,
we know that n ≤ s (i.e., there are at most as many positive roots as sign changes) and (s− n)
is an even number if n < s. Hence, there are either 3 or 1 positive roots in our case, which
are all positive since limcl→0 f(cl) = −∞. By continuity, and the changes in the signs of the
derivatives when there are multiple roots, it follows that there at most two stable equilibria.
Indeed, applying Laguerre’s generalisation of Descartes’ rule to the first and second derivatives
of f(·) reveals that f ′(·) changes sign at most twice and that f ′′(·) changes signs at most once.
The final part of the proposition results from the fact that f(·) increases from −∞ at cl = 0.
Hence, ∂f(·)/∂cl must be strictly positive at the smallest root (whenever one exists). To see
that the third root of f(·) is outside the relevant range [0, α] (a cl > α implies a negative city
size, which does not make any economic sense), it is sufficient to know that f(α) = −fE and
limcl→+∞ f(cl) = limcl→+∞ f
′(cl) = +∞. Thus, the largest root of f(·) is (strictly) larger than α
if (and only if) the parameter fE is (strictly) positive.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Recall Proposition 2: All stable equilibrium city sizes H∗ are non-increasing in θ and non-
decreasing in A and α. Put differently, lower commuting costs (lower θ), a better productivity
support (lower cmax and thus higher A), more product differentiation (lower γ and thus higher
A), and stronger preference for the differentiated good (larger α) all weakly increase city size at
any stable equilibrium.
Proof. It is readily verified that, for any given value of cl, f(·) is strictly decreasing in cmax
and θ. Assume that c∗l ∈ (0, α] is a stable equilibrium. Two cases may arise: either f(c
∗
l ) ≤ 0
(with c∗l = α), which corresponds to the rural equilibrium; or f(c
∗
l ) = 0, such that we are at an
urban equilibrium. Consider an increase in θ (or in cmax). Then since f(·) shifts down everywhere,
it must be that f(c∗l ) < 0 in the first case: the rural equilibrium remains stable, and H
∗ = 0 is
non-increasing from its initial value (which is also 0). In the second case, f(c∗l ) < 0 after the
shift. Since stability implies that ∂f(c∗l )/∂cl > 0, and since f(·) is continuous, the equilibrium
must lie on the right of the previous one (hence a larger c∗l , i.e., a smaller H
∗). Of course, this
encompasses the case where the new H∗ can decrease to zero as we hit the corner and switch
from an urban to a rural equilibrium.
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Note finally that larger α and smaller γ both increase all stable equilibrium city sizes unam-
biguously. The proof is identical to the foregoing.
B.3. Complement to the proof of Proposition 4
To see that the condition θ > θR is also necessary to ensure that there exists no pair {H, cl} with
cl ∈ (0, α) that is compatible with an equilibrium, we may proceed as follows.
Proof. First, we evaluate (15) at {θ, fE} = {θU , 0}. The resulting free-entry condition,
evaluated with equality, can be written as 2α2+k/(2 + k) − αc1+kl + c
2+k
l (k − 1)/(k + 2) = 0. It
follows from Laguerre’s (1883) result that this expression has at most one root in (0, α). Invoking
next its continuity, it is then straightforward to show that the LHS of this expression has exactly
one root in cl ∈ (0, α) by noting that it is positive when evaluated at cl = 0 and negative when
evaluated at cl = α. Second, we then evaluate (15) at {θ, f
E} = {θR, 0}. The resulting free-entry
condition, evaluated with equality, can be written as 3α2+k/(2+k)−αc1+kl +c
2+k
l (k−1)/(2+k) = 0.
Using the same arguments as in the foregoing, it is then straightforward to show that the LHS
of this expression has a unique root at cl = α by noting that the term in the square bracket is
positive when evaluated at cl = 0 and nil when evaluated at cl = α, and by continuity of this
expression. Therefore, since (15) is continuous in both θ and cl, it must be that, if θ < θ
R, then
(15) admits a solution for cl in (0, α), which establishes the necessary part.
B.4. Gini coefficients
In this appendix, we derive the Gini coefficient of income inequality (18). First, aggregate income
in city h across all draws c is given by
Wh(ch) ≡ HhG(ch)
∫ ch
0
Hh
4γ
(ch − c)
2dGh(c) =
H2hc
2+k
h c
−k
max
2γ(1 + k)(2 + k)
since all agents with c ≥ ch have zero income. The total income accruing to agents with draw
x ≤ ch is thus
Wh(x) ≡ HhG(ch)
∫ x
0
Hh
4γ
(ch − c)
2dGh(c) =
H2h
4γ
(
x
cmax
)k (
c2h −
2k
1 + k
x+
k
2 + k
x2
)
,
and their income share is Wh(x)/Wh(ch). To compute the Gini coefficient, we have to link the
income share with the population share. To do so, we need to switch to the distribution in terms
of population shares (and not in terms of cost levels c). Let y ≡ (x/cmax)
k, i.e., x = y1/kcmax.
Using this change in variables, the new upper bound for integration is given by y = (ch/cmax)
k,
and we obtain the integral of the Lorenz curve for the surviving agents as follows:∫ ( chcmax )k
0
Wh(y)
Wh(ch)
dy −
∫ ( chcmax )k
0
xdx =
2 + 7k
4 + 8k
(
ch
cmax
)k
−
1
2
(
ch
cmax
)2k
(B.1)
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To finally obtain the Gini coefficient, we need to add the integral of the Lorenz curve for the
agent who do not produce. This is given by
∫ 1
( chcmax )
k
(1− x)dx =
1
2
[(
ch
cmax
)k
− 1
]2
(B.2)
Summing (B.2) and (B.1) then yields the Gini index as follows:
Ginih(k; ch) = 1−
2 + k
2 + 4k
(
ch
cmax
)k
. (B.3)
Appendix C: Proofs for Section 4
C.1. Proofs of Propositions 11 to 14
In this Appendix we state and prove Propositions 11, 12, 13 and 14, which are respectively
equivalent to Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 4 as given in Section 3.
Proposition 11 (number of symmetric equilibria) Let fE ≥ 0. Then the function f(·) in
(21) has at either one or three positive roots, of which at most two are in [0, α). Consequently,
there exist at most two stable equilibria: the urban equilibrium and the rural equilibrium. If no
stable urban equilibrium exists, then the rural equilibrium is unique. Furthermore, the equilibrium
associated with the smallest value of cl (the largest Hl) is always stable.
Proof. Straightforward extension of the proof of Proposition 1.
Proposition 12 (monotonicity of urban equilibria) If the interior equilibrium exists, then
the (stable) equilibrium city size H∗ is non-increasing in θ and non-decreasing in A and α. Put
differently, lower commuting costs (lower θ), a better productivity support (lower cmax and thus
higher A), more product differentiation (lower γ and thus higher A), and stronger preference for
the differentiated good (larger α) each increase city size at the stable equilibrium.
Proof. Straightforward extension of the proof of Proposition 2.
When does which type of equilibrium arise?
Proposition 13 (symmetric equilibria without cities) The symmetric equilibrium without
cities (H∗l = 0 and c
∗
l = α) exists and is stable for all f
E > 0. When fE = 0, it still exists but is
a stable equilibrium iff θ ≥ θU .
Proof. This proposition is a simple corollary to Proposition 3.
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The intuition of Proposition 3 carries over to Proposition 13. In addition, when there are no net
opportunity costs for becoming an entrepreneur, the rural equilibrium exists and may be stable
provided that trade costs are high (low Φ), suggesting that high trade and transportation costs
are an impediment to the rise of trading cities. When there are no net entry costs for becoming
an entrepreneur, (19) is equivalent to
2θ
A(1 + Φ)
≥ c1+kl
(
α−
k − 1
2 + k
cl
)
, (C.1)
the right-hand side of which is strictly concave in cl, increasing in cl at the limit cl → 0 and its
maximum value is given by 3α2+k/(2 + k). Hence the condition
θ <
3
2
A(1 + Φ)
α2+k
2 + k
=
3
2
θU ≡ θR
makes sure that there exists c∗l ∈ (0, α) that is an equilibrium.
Proposition 14 (city resililence) Assume that there are no net entry costs for becoming an
entrepreneur (fE = 0). Then: (i) H∗ = 0 is the only stable equilibrium for all θ > θR; (ii) there
exists a {H∗, c∗l } ∈ R++× (0, α) that is the unique stable equilibrium for all θ < θ
U ; and (iii) for
θU < θ < θR, both H∗ = 0 and some {H∗, c∗l } ∈ R++ × (0, α) are stable equilibria.
Proof. Straightforward application of the foregoing results.
C.2. Gini coefficients and trading cities
Let z(Λ, τ, k) ≡ −λ(Λ, τ, k)/2 so that (22) may be rewriten as
Ginil(Λ, τ, k; cl) = 1 + 2z(Λ, τ, k)
(
cl
cmax
)k
,
with z(·) < 0 for all Λ, τ and k. Fastidious calculations similar to those leading to (18) in
appendix B.4. yield
z(Λ, τ, k) = −1 +
φ
2(1 + 2k)
(Λ− 1) [(τ − 1)2(1 + 2k)(2 + k)(1 + k) + 2(τ − 1)(2 + k)(1 + 3k) + 2 + 7k]
2τ 2 + (Λ− 1) [(τ − 1)2(2 + k)(1 + k) + 2(τ − 1)(2 + k) + 2]
+
1
2(1 + 2k)
(2 + 7k)τ 2
2τ 2 + (Λ− 1) [(τ − 1)2(2 + k)(1 + k) + 2(τ − 1)(2 + k) + 2]
from which it follows that −2z(1, τ, k) = (2+k)/(2+4k) and that −2z(Λ, 1, k) = (2+k)/(2+4k).
Recall now Proposition 7: Let income inequality be measured by the Gini coefficient at the sym-
metric equilibrium. Then income inequality is decreasing in trade/transportation costs, namely
∂Ginil/∂τ < 0.
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Proof. Differentiating z(Λ, τ, k) with respect to τ yields:
∂z(Λ, τ, k)
∂τ
= −
k(Λ− 1)
1 + 2k
{
φ [τ 2κ2 + τκ1 + κ0]
{(Λ− 1) [τ 2(1 + k)(2 + k)− τ(2 + k)2k + (1 + k)k] + 2τ 2}2
+
τ(2 + 7k) [(τ − 1)(2 + k) + 1]
{(Λ− 1) [τ 2(1 + k)(2 + k)− τ(2 + k)2k + (1 + k)k] + 2τ 2}2
−
∂φ
∂τ
1
k
(τ − 1)2(1 + k)(2 + k)(1 + 2k) + 2(τ − 1)(2 + k)(3k + 1) + (2 + 7k)
(Λ− 1) [τ 2(1 + k)(2 + k)− τ(2 + k)2k + (1 + k)k] + 2τ 2
}
where κ2 ≡ (Λ − 1)(1 + k)(2 + k)
2 − 4k(2 + k), κ1 ≡ 3(Λ − 1)(1 + k)(2 + k) − 2k(7 + 2k) and
κ0 ≡ (Λ−1)(2+k)−6k all have ambiguous signs; therefore, the term in the first line of the RHS
above cannot be signed a-priori. By contrast, the terms on the second and third lines are positive
by inspection. However, if φ [τ 2κ2 + τκ1 + κ0] is negative, then it is larger than τ
2κ2 + τκ1 + κ0
and, adding the terms of the first and second lines, implies
φ
[
τ 2κ2 + τκ1 + κ0
]
+ τ(2 + 7k) [(τ − 1)(2 + k) + 1]
> τ 2κ2 + τκ1 + κ0 + τ(2 + 7k) [(τ − 1)(2 + k) + 1]
= (2 + k)(Λ− 1)
[
(1 + k)(2 + k)(τ − 1)2 + 3(1 + k)(τ − 1) + 1
]
+(2 + k)
[
(2 + 3k)(τ − 1)2 + 3(1 + k)(τ − 1) + 1
]
> 0
which in turn implies that ∂z(Λ, τ, k)/∂τ < 0 for all Λ, τ and k.
We have already established in Proposition 6 that selection gets tougher as trade gets freer
(∂cl/∂τ > 0), therefore ∂Ginil/∂τ ≡ 2 [cl(·)/cmax]
k {∂z(·)/∂τ + z(·)c−1l ∂cl(·)/∂τ} < 0.
For the sake of completeness, note that
∂z(Λ, τ, k)
∂Λ
= −
1
1 + 2k
{
−τ 2φ [(1 + k)(2 + k)(1 + 2k)(τ − 1)2 + 2(2 + k)(1 + 3k)(τ − 1) + 2 + 7k]
{(Λ− 1) [τ 2(1 + k)(2 + k)− τ(2 + k)2k + (1 + k)k] + 2τ 2}2
+
(2 + 7k)τ 2 [(1 + k)(2 + k)(τ − 1)2 + 2(2 + k)(τ − 1) + 2]
2 {(Λ− 1) [τ 2(1 + k)(2 + k)− τ(2 + k)2k + (1 + k)k] + 2τ 2}2
}
< −
k
1 + 2k
τ 2(τ − 1)(2 + k) [3(1 + k)(τ − 1) + 2]
2 {(Λ− 1) [τ 2(1 + k)(2 + k)− τ(2 + k)2k + (1 + k)k] + 2τ 2}2
< 0.
Therefore, given cl, granting access to more urban markets increases wages of the unperforming
exporters relative to the wages of the most productive ones; this positive effect is strong enough
to overcome the negative one on income inequalities that arises as a result of the wages of
all successful entrepreneurs going up. However, since selection gets tougher as trade gets freer
(∂cl/∂τ > 0), the two effects work in opposite directions. Our numerical simulations suggest that
the latter indirect effect always dominates the former, direct effect. More precisely, the fact that
a larger Λ increases the Gini coefficient is entirely due to the increase in selection. By contrast,
the fact that a lower τ increases the Gini is due to the increase in selection and to the increase
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of the profits of most productive entrepreneurs (exporters in particular) relative to those of the
least productive entrepreneurs (the purely domestic producers and those who fail to produce, in
particular).
Appendix D: Proofs for Section 5
D.1. Proof of Proposition 8
Recall Proposition 8: Assume that regions are ex ante (or fundamentally) symmetric, i.e. they
face the same bilateral trade costs and have identical ability supports. Then, at any equilibrium,
selection is tougher in larger cities: cl < ch ⇐⇒ Hl > Hh, l 6= h. Furthermore, ∂Hl/∂cl < 0
and ∂Hl/∂ch > 0.
Proof. Straighforward rearrangement of (25) yields
α− cl
α− ch
(
ch
cl
)1+k
=
(1− φ)Hl + φ
∑Λ
i=1Hi
(1− φ)Hh + φ
∑Λ
i=1Hi
which implies
cl < ch ⇐⇒ Hl > Hh.
To get the second result, recall that the solution to the linear system Fh = x is given by
h = det(F)−1cof(F)Tx, where cof(F) stands for the matrix of cofactors associated with F. As a
result,
∂Hl
∂cl
=
det(Fl,l)
det(F)
where det(Fl,l) is the minor of the (Λ−1)× (Λ−1) square matrix cut down from F by removing
its lth column and its lth row. The matrix Fl,l, like F, has only 1’s on its main diagonal and φ off
its main diagonal. Thus, its determinant is also positive, i.e. det(Fl,l) > 0. By the same token,
∂Hl
∂ch
=
det(Fh,l)
det(F)
.
Now, from the Gaussian elmination algorithm, we know that det(Fh,l) = − det(Fl,l) for l 6= h
since Fh,l and Fl,l differ by a column permutation only. Hence det(Fh,l) < 0, which completes
the proof.
D.2. Proof of Proposition 9
Recall Proposition 9: Assume that there are no net entry costs for becoming an entrepreneur
(fE = 0). Then there exists no equilibrium such that H∗l > 0 and H
∗
h = 0 for all h 6= l.
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Proof. Let fE = 0. The free-entry equilibrium condition for h (evaluated at the prospective
equilibrium Hh = 0 and Hl > 0) is given by
E(∆Vh) = φA
[Hlc
2+k
l +
∑
i6=l,hHic
2+k
i ]
2 + k
+
(α− ch)
2η
[
α−
1 + k
2 + k
ch
]
≤ 0
which never holds since ch ≤ α, φ
∑
i6=l,hHic
2+k
i ≥ 0 and Hl > 0. Thus asymmetric equilibria
in which one region does not develop a city but the other does do not exist in the simple case
where fE = 0.
More generally, it can be shown that there exist no other asymmetric equilibria with H∗l , H
∗
h > 0
and H∗l 6= H
∗
h. The reason is that the loci E(∆Vl) = 0 and E(∆Vh) = 0 intersect only once in
the zone where Hl > 0 and Hh > 0.
D.3. Proof of Proposition 10
Recall Proposition 10: Assume that fE and θ are low enough so that a stable urban equilibrium
exists when φ = 0. Then there exists a unique threshold φsust in (0, 1), called the ‘sustain point’,
such that a core-periphery equilibrium in the two-region case, with H∗l > 0 and H
∗
h = 0 for all
h 6= l, exists if (and only if) φ < φsust (i.e. inter-city trade costs are large enough).
Proof. All results hold by continuity of expressions (29)–(32) Step (i): from Proposition 1,
we know that (29) admits at most one stable root in the interval (0, α). Let us denote this root
by c∗l and assume that f
E and θ are small enough so that a root with these properties exists.
Note that c∗l is invariant in φ. Step (ii): (31) and (32) together imply an implicit function of cl
and ch:
α− cl
α− ch
(
ch
cl
)1+k
=
1
φ
.
Evaluating this expression at c∗l yields a unique c
∗
h = ch(φ; c
∗
l ), which is decreasing and convex in
φ. It is also readily verfied that ch(0; c
∗
l ) = α and ch(1, c
∗
l ) = c
∗
l . Step (iii): define f
∗
h(φ) as the
RHS of the free-entry condition (30) evaluated at c∗h = ch(φ; c
∗
l ), using (31) to substitute for H
∗
l
and the definition of CS(·) in (7) to keep the expression synthetic:
f ∗h(φ) ≡ φ
(α− c∗l )c
∗
l
η(2 + k)
+ CS(c∗h)− f
E.
Then,
f ∗h(0) = CS(α)− f
E = −fE < 0
so that the core-periphery outcome is a stable equilibrium at the limit φ = 0. Also,
f ∗h(1) =
(α− c∗l )c
∗
l
η(2 + k)
+ CS(c∗l )− f
E = f ∗l + θH
∗
l = θH
∗ > 0
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where f ∗l is defined as the right-hand side of the free-entry condition (29) evaluated at c
∗
l and H
∗
l .
Clearly, f ∗l = 0 by definition. This intermediate result thus establishes that the core-periphery
outcome is not an equilibrium at the limit φ = 1. Step (iv): standard algebra reveals that f ∗h(·)
is convex and increasing in φ on (0, α). Thus, by continuity, there exists a unique φsust ∈ (0, 1)
such that
f ∗h(φ
sust) = 0
and f ∗h(φ
sust) < 0 if (and only if) φ < φsust.
D.4. Some core-periphery results with Λ > 2
In this appendix we present the analytical descriptions of other core-periphery equilibria in the
Λ-region case, where Λ > 2. We also provide numerical examples illustrating these types of
equilibria. Assume that there are Λ = 4 regions which are symmetrically located, i.e., the
bilateral cost is τ between any two pair of regions. Formally, a core-periphery configuration
whereby H∗l > 0, 0 < c
∗
l , c
∗
h ≤ α and H
∗
h = 0, for all h 6= l, will be part of an equilibrum if the
following conditions hold simultaneously for some H∗l , c
∗
l and {c
∗
h}h 6=l in the relevant ranges:
0 = A
(Hl +H0)c
2+k
l + φH0c
2+k
h
2 + k
+
α− cl
2η
[
α−
1 + k
2 + k
cl
]
− θ(Hl +H0)− f
E
0 ≥ A
(1 + Φ− φ)H0c
2+k
h + φ(Hl +H0)c
2+k
l
2 + k
+
α− ch
2η
[
α−
1 + k
2 + k
ch
]
− θH0 − f
E, ∀h 6= l
0 ≡ −φHl +
α− ch
c1+kh Aη
, ∀h 6= l
0 ≡ −Hl +
α− cl
c1+kl Aη
.
Note that since we focus on the symmetric case, the second and the third conditions are identical
for all the peripheral regions.
One can readily construct an example with extreme urban primacy using the following pa-
rameter values for Λ = 4 regions: α = 17.2, γ = 2, η = 22.5, H0 = 4, τ = 1.5, k = 1.2, cmax = 30,
fE = 12, θ = 0.14. One resulting stable equilibrium is such that H∗1 = 1.6632, c
∗
1 = 8.7397, and
c∗i = 10.0806 for i = 2, 3, 4.
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The foregoing equilibrium conditions reveal that, given τ and the other parameters of the
model, this extreme form of urban primacy is less likely to arise at equilibrium the larger is
Λ. However, if it does arise, the size of the primate city will be larger the larger φ. The first
37When there are more than two regions, there are an infinity of possible perturbations of any equilibrium.
In that case, as shown in the technical Appendix TA.2, we need to check that the Jacobian associated with the
equilibrium conditions is negative definite. In the numerical applications presented in this paper, we check the
full stability condition on the Jacobian of f (see footnote 22 in Section 4.2 for further details). The Mathematica
code of the numerical procedure is available from the authors upon request.
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equilibrium condition shifts up with φ, so that larger values of φ decrease c∗l and, therefore,
increase H∗l . In words, primate cities grow as φ rises. Yet, the second condition shifts also up
with Φ (hence, with Λ), thereby making this configuration less likely to remain an equilibrium.
The freeness of trade (an exogenous measure of trade openness) increases in the number of trading
partners. Therefore, increasing Λ should have qualititatively similar effects to increasing φ.
Switching to Λ = 10 regions, and keeping the same parameter values as before, we have still
extreme urban primacy with H∗1 = 4.4092, c
∗
1 = 6.2967 and c
∗
i = 7.4619 for i = 2, 3, . . . , 10. The
core grows bigger, as stated in the foregoing. However, when Λ = 11, extreme urban primacy
is no longer feasible and we switch to a different equilibrium configuration with multiple core
regions.
Technical appendix
The following appendix provides technical details on stability and on how to implement the
numerical procedures for constructing different types of equilibria.
TA.1. Additional stability results
Combining (23) and (24) we obtain an expression for dE(∆Vl)/d lnH as follows:
dE(∆Vl)
d lnH
= −θH −
1− φ
1 + Φ
α− cl
2η
cl
2 + k
α− 2cl
α + k(α− cl)
+
1
η
[
1− φ
1 + Φ
(α− cl)
]2
cl
α+ k(α− cl)
From this expression, observe that dE(∆Vl) < 0 at the limit τ → 1 (φ→ 1). The net benefit of
adding one entrepreneur to city l is converging to the urban cost at the rate 1− φ. In addition,
note that the gross benefit of adding one entrepreneur to city l is converging to zero at the rate
(1−φ)2, i.e. twice as fast. Note that the sign of the second term is ambiguous: it is non-negative
if the root cl ∈ (0, α/2] and non-positive if cl ∈ (α/2, α]. Going back to (23), we observe that the
this term is the net effect of the backward (demand) linkage and the congestion/selection effects.
A large market size is good for (expected) profits but at the same time it is associated with
a tougher environment. As in Krugman (1991), entrepreneurs’ nominal wages might actually
be negatively linked to market size; this happens when a stable equilibrium arises for some
cl ∈ (0, α/2). In this cases, city l is a consumer city (in the sense of the previous section) and
this type of equilibrium arises because a lower consumer price index (a larger consumer surplus)
more than compensates urban dwellers for the urban costs they incur by living in a large city.
When the lower consumer price index falls short of the larger urban costs, city l is a producer city
with cl ∈ (α/2, α) arising at equilibrium . In a sense, the model is more realistic and more general
than Krugman’s in the sense that living in large urban area is associated with more expensive
dwellings and commuting (see also Murata and Thisse, 2005).
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As we cannot obtain closed form solutions for the equilibrium H and cl, to make further
progress, we totally differentiate (12) and evaluate it at the symmetric equilibrium. We obtain:
dE(∆Vl) =
A
2 + k
{
d
[
Hc2+kl
]
+ φ
∑
h 6=l
d
[
Hhc
2+k
h
]}
+ d
[
α− cl
2η
(
α−
1 + k
2 + k
cl
)]
− θdH
=
(1 + Φ)A
2 + k
d
[
Hc2+kl
]
+ d
[
α− cl
2η
(
α−
1 + k
2 + k
cl
)]
− θdH (TA.1)
+
(1 + Φ)A
2 + k
∑
h 6=l
{
d
[
Hhc
2+k
h
]
− d
[
Hc2+kl
]}
≤ −
(1 + Φ)A
2 + k
d
[
Hc2+kl
]
.
The step to get to the second line follows from simple rearrangement of terms and by definition
of Φ. The term in the first line of this expression is non-positive by the stability of the symmetric
equilibrium in the sense of Proposition 14, which explains the inequality sign to get from the
third to the fourth line of this expression. Thus, the symmetric equilibrium is stable at the limit
τ = ∞; this limiting case corresponds to the case studied in the previous section, so this result
comes at no surprise.
As can be seen from (TA.1), an alternative sufficient condition for the symmetric equilibrium
to be stable is given by d
[
Hc2+kl
]
/dcl > 0. When does this hold? To answer this question,
rearrange (20) as follows:
Hc2+kl =
(α− cl)cl
(1 + Φ)Aη
(TA.2)
which is increasing in cl for cl ∈ (0, α/2) and decreasing in cl for cl ∈ (α/2, α). Therefore, the
system is stable regardless of the value of φ if the equilibrium cl is in (0, α/2). Generically,
there exists a positive measure of parameter combinations such that this condition is satisfied at
equilibrium.
To obtain additional results, let us briefly consider the simple case (fE = 0). In this case,
pluging (TA.2) into (12) yields
E(∆Vl) = f(cl) ≡
α− cl
η
[
cl
2 + k
+
1
2
(
α−
1 + k
2 + k
cl
)
− θckmax
2γ(1 + k)
1 + φ
c
−(1+k)
l
]
= 0. (TA.3)
By inspection, c∗l = α is always a root of the equation f(.). It follows from Laguerre’s general-
ization of Descartes’ rule of signs and by continuity that there is at most one root in (0, α) that
corresponds to a stable equilibrium. Further analysis, available from the authors upon request,
show that there exist a cutoff value for θ in (0, θR), denoted by θ
α/2
0 , such that a stable equilib-
rium with c∗l ∈ (0, α/2) exists if θ ∈ [0, θ
α/2
0 ) and a stable equilibrium with c
∗
l ∈ [α/2, α] exists if
θ ∈ [θ
α/2
0 , θ
R].
TA.2. General procedure to check stability numerically
In the numerical application, we can check stability for any potential equilibrium candidate
(including arbitrary corner solutions) more thoroughly as follows. Let Ω+ and Ω0 denote the
53
sets of regions with and without a city at equilibrium, respectively. Assume that there are z
regions without a city. The numerical procedure for constructing equilibria and for checking
their stability is then as follows.
Let c = (c1 c2 . . . cΛ) and let H = (H1 H2 . . . HΛ). First, the non-positive expected profit
is given by
E(∆Vl) =
A
k + 2
∑
h∈Ω+
φlhH
∗
hc
∗2+k
h +
(α− c∗l )
2η
[
α−
1 + k
2 + k
c∗l
]
− fE − θH∗l ≡ fl(c,H) ≤ 0 (TA.4)
for any region. Condition (TA.4) must hold with equality for all l ∈ Ω+ and with strict inequality
for all l ∈ Ω0. Second, for any l, the identity for the masses of sellers can be rewritten as:
gl(c,H) ≡ A
α− c∗l
ηc∗1+kl
−
∑
h∈Ω+
φhlH
∗
h ≡ 0 (TA.5)
Conditions (TA.4) for l ∈ Ω+ and conditions (TA.5) for all l = 1, 2, . . . ,Λ constitute a system of
2Λ − z equations in the 2Λ − z unknowns {Hl}Ω+ and {cl}Λ. Denote by (c
∗,H∗) a solution to
that system. If fl(c
∗,H∗) < 0 for all l ∈ Ω0, this solution is an equilibrium candidate.
To check whether this solution is a stable equilibrium we proceed as follows. We can uniquely
solve the set of equations gl(c,H) = 0 for all l ∈ Ω
+ for the Hl = Hl(cΩ+) for l ∈ Ω
+. Note that
cΩ+ denotes the Λ− z dimensional vector of the {cl}Ω+ . We can thus substitute out the {Hl}Ω+
in (TA.4). Since Hl = 0 for l ∈ Ω
0, we obtain a system of Λ− z equations in the Λ variables cl.
To check whether no deviation from one city to another is profitable, we have to make sure that
the Jacobian associated with {fl}Ω+ in the variables {cl}Ω+ is positive definite at c
∗ (recall that
we already substituted out the Hl) on the subset generated by the constraints (TA.5) for l ∈ Ω
0.
After substituting the positive Hl into (TA.5), the constraints are given by
gl(c) ≡ A
α− cl
ηc1+kl
−
∑
h∈Ω+
φhlHh(cΩ+) ≡ 0 (TA.6)
for all l ∈ Ω0. These constraints define on a one-to-one basis the equilibrium relationships
between any ci with i ∈ Ω
0 and the set of variables cl with l ∈ Ω
+. Applying the implicit function
theorem, we then obtain dcl/dci for l ∈ Ω
0 and i ∈ Ω+. This finally allows to compute the Λ− z
square matrix of the Jacobian of {fl}Ω+ in {cl}Ω+ , taking into account the GE constraints via the
dcl/dci terms. It can readily be evaluated at the equilibrium candidate (c
∗,H∗). The equilibrium
canditate is (locally) stable if this Jacobian is positive definite (which is the higher-dimensional
extension of the simple stability condition df(·)/dcl > 0 used in the simple cases).
38
38The procedure can be readily implemented with Mathematica and the code is available from the authors upon
request.
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Table 1 — Size and income inequality
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Year 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2007
Obs. 367 507 367 367 367 358 510
Sample MSA CBSA MSA MSA MSA MSA CBSA
size .0106 .0136 .0091 .0108 .0090 .0136
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
size2 −.0004 −.0005 −.0003 −.0004 −.0003 −.0005
(.007) (.000) (.027) (.023) (.028) (.000)
medi −.0015 −.0014 −.0014 −.0021 −.0020 −.0012 −.0015
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
black .0519 .0601
(.000) (.000)
edu .1394 .1529
(.000) (.000)
dens .0383
(.000)
Adj R2 .2116 .1757 .2441 .2693 .3133 .1364 .1969
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is the household income Gini
coefficient. p-values are given in parenthesis. All regressions include a constant
term. Explanatory variables are defined as follows: size = population size of
the MSA in millions; medi = household median income in inflation-adjusted 1000
US$; black = share of black or Afro-American population; edu = share of popula-
tion with some college education or higher; dens = population in 1000 per square
mile. All data is from the 2006 American Community Survey (U.S. Census Bu-
reau), except for MSA surface data which is from the 2000 Census of Population
and Housing (U.S. Census Bureau). Data for the 2007 American Community
Survey are based on 1-year estimates.
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Table 2 — ‘Cannibalisation’ effects and the agglomeration shadow
Quasi-maximum likelihood Robust bayesian estimates
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x)
Obs. 367 367 367 507 363 367 367 367 507 363
Sample MSA MSA MSA CBSA MSA MSA MSA MSA CBSA MSA
k 1 1.1 1.2 1 1 1 1.1 1.2 1 1
medi .0574 .0576 .0576 .0498 .0573 .0356 .0356 .0359 .0276 .0356
(.000) (.000) (0.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (0.000) (.000) (.000)
ρ −1.3725 −2.1972 −3.4633 −.9285 −1.3321 −.8893 −.9051 −2.3714 −.5405 −.8632
(.072) (.068) (.063) (.391) (.081) (.029) (.028) (.031) (.036) (.036)
popg −5.1201 −2.8287
(.042) (.022)
Pseudo R2 .3390 .3401 .3411 .3334 .3519 .3348 .3349 0.3368 .3296 .3482
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is MSA size (in millions) in 2006. z-values in parenthesis. All
regressions include a constant term (not shown) and use a numerical adjustment to control for the fact that the weight
matrix is not row-standardized. Explanatory variables are defined as follows: medi = household median income in
inflation-adjusted 1000 US$ for 2006; popg = population growth in % between 2005 and 2006. The distance matrix
constructed as φij = d
−k
ij , where dij is great-circle distance in km between the metropolitan and/or micropolitan areas.
Bayesian estimates are computed using 25000 MCMC draws, discarding the first 10000. The pseudo R2 is computed as
the linear correlation between y and by. All data is from the 2006 American Community Survey (U.S. Bureau of Census).
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Table 3 — Market potential regressions
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Obs. 367 367 499 507 499 494 356
Sample MSA MSA CBSA CBSA CBSA CBSA MSA
dist < 3 dist < 3
size .0134 .0093 .0124 .0091
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
size2 −.0005 −.0003 −.0005 −.0003
(.000) (.016) (.000) (.033)
mp .0057 .0052 .0054
(.000) (.000) (.000)
dist .0061 .0091 .0018 .0011
(.000) (.000) (.476) (.701)
medi −.0014 −.0019 −.0019 −.0015 −.0020 −.0012 −.0012
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
black .0633 .0816 .0912
(.000) (.000) (.000)
edu .1551 .1983 .1885
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Adj R2 .1930 .3016 .3170 .1914 .3666 .1190 .1155
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is the household income Gini
coefficient in 2006. p-values are given in parenthesis. All regressions include a
constant term. Explanatory variables are defined as follows: size = population
size of the MSA in millions; medi = household median income in inflation-adjusted
1000 US$; black = share of black or African American population; edu = share
of population with some college education or higher; mp = market potential,
defined as mpj ≡ popj+sumi6=j(popi/dij ), and where dij is great circle distance
in kilometers; dist = average distance to all other cities (thousand km). All data
is from the 2006 American Community Survey (U.S. Census Bureau), except for
MSA surface data which is from the 2000 Census of Population and Housing (U.S.
Census Bureau).
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Figure 3(a): Gini coefficient as a function of trade costs using the stable c∗l (Λ = 4)
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Figure 3(b): Gini coefficient as a function of trade costs using the stable c∗l (Λ = 10)
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